Welcome to Arnon Cahen's Home
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Contact info:
email:
acahen (at) wustl (dot) edu
I am a graduate student working on my dissertation,
‘Perception and Nonconceptual Apprehension,’ in the philosophy department, PNP
(Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology) program, at Washington
University, in St. Louis.
Research interests and
dissertation in brief:
Much of what we do, we do for
reasons. When deliberating about which retirement fund to invest in, we consider
what we believe is the case and what outcomes we desire. We act on the basis of
what we (correctly or incorrectly) consider would best satisfy these desires.
In such cases, we are usually able to articulate our reasons in a way that
makes transparent the light by which we find the subsequent actions
appropriate. However, the vast majority of our waking life is guided by reasons
that we are unable to articulate in this way. We navigate through a messy room
with ease, grasp our coffee mug appropriately, and hit a tennis serve with
moderate precision. Nonetheless, we are at a loss when attempting to articulate
the lights by which we find appropriate that path through the room, that way of
grasping the mug, or of hitting the serve. Saying that it seemed the right
thing to do at the time is not illuminating. What is it about how things seemed
to us at the time in light of which we found appropriate that action rather
than another?
My research interests concern the nature of inarticulable reasons. It is our
responsiveness to such reasons that governs the bulk of our worldly engagements
and largely determines the contours of our agency. Reflecting on the above
examples, we are compelled to ask: Are they cases in which we do not have
reasons? Are they cases in which we have reasons but are unaware of having
them? Do they, instead, illustrate the availability of a kind of reason that is
inarticulable by those of us having and acting in its light? If the latter,
what is it to have such reasons, and how are we to explain our ability to act
on their basis? What does the availability of such reasons tell us about the
extent of our responsibility as epistemic, and moral, agents? And, what
relations, epistemic, metaphysical, and cognitive, obtain between those reasons
we cannot articulate and those that we can? These are but a handful of
questions that speak to the broad ramifications that exploring inarticulable
reasons has on the philosophy of mind, epistemology, cognitive science, agency,
and the nature of the self. The nature of inarticulable reasons has further
ramifications to our understanding the cognitive and epistemic status of
pre-linguistic creatures, infants, apes, and other members of the animal
kingdom.
My dissertation is a first step within this broader research project. It is
focused on the role that perception plays in contributing to the reasons for
which perceivers undertake an action or modify their beliefs. Perception is not
merely a matter of the world impinging on our senses. It is primarily a mode by
which perceivers are initiated into reasoned engagements with the world. The
notion of ‘apprehension’ in the title is meant to capture this reason-giving
nature of perception. Apprehending one’s environment is not the passive having
of sensory impressions. Rather, it is an active taking of the environment such
that it can serve as a reason for which one acts and deliberates as one does.
The further aim of the dissertation is to articulate what perception must be
like if it is to involve such apprehension. This is all the more challenging,
if perceivers for whom perception provides reasons are not necessarily in a
position to articulate these reasons. At least not to an extent that would make
transparent the appropriateness of their ensuing actions or beliefs. The
appearance of the term ‘nonconceptual’ in the title (roughly) reflects this
latter claim. It is the inarticulable nature of the reasons perception provides
that proves especially challenging to an account of perception as
reason-giving. It is also a challenge that has a long history within
epistemology.
In the dissertation I argue for a reformulation of what having a reason-giving
state in general amounts to, so as to make room for one’s having inarticulable
reasons. I further provide a substantive account of perception that
accommodates perception as a reason-giving state,
albeit not necessarily reasons the perceiver is ipso facto in a position to
articulate.
Further interests:
In Philosophy - My current interest is,
unsurprisingly, first and foremost to finish the dissertation. But more
broadly, I am very interested in the metaphysics of the self, time, causation,
mental causation, the mind-body problem, and consciousness. I am also
interested of course in the various relation between
theories of concepts and the notion of representational content, and am
especially interested in the relations between intentional/representational
content and phenomenal content. My dissertation speaks to
many of these issues.
Non-Philosophy - I am especially concerned about
the political happenings in
A few survival tips for newcomers
in St. Louis.