The Ecology and Politics of the Kibbutz

The Kibbutz: Myth and Reality

...the story of the early Zionist pioneers who, in revolt against their diaspora origins, left their homes in Eastern Europe and came to the Land of Israel to find redemption through the production of a new Jewish farmer, attachment to the land, and the creation of new communal ways of life (1997:156).

The extent to which this myth has become the generally accepted truth is made clear by Encarta's entry for "kibbutz", which calls the kibbutz a "communal farm" and asserts that "most kibbutzim are entirely agricultural." The entry also adds to the pioneering myth of settling an empty land: "By living and working collectively, they were able to build homes and to begin to irrigate and farm the barren desert land." The perpetuation of this myth makes for an interesting comparison between two supposed opposites: the smallholder farmer and the collective farm.

Smallholder agriculture has been most intensively studied by Robert Netting. In his book, Smallholders, Householders (1993), Netting compares smallholders cross-culturally in part to show how the basic model of smallholders crosscuts environmental conditions. He defines smallholders in part as intensive farmers,

producing relatively high annual or multicrop yields from permanent fields that are seldom or never rested, with fertility restored and sustained by practices such as thorough tillage, crop diversification and rotation, animal husbandry, fertilization, irrigation, drainage, and terracing. I am...talking here about...gardens and orchards, about rice paddies, dairy farms, and chinampas (1993:3).

Netting also specifies a social structure that correlates with smallholding the household. Although he writes that "members of a collective, and in fact these agricultural institutions seem poorly adapted to a regime of intensive cultivation" (Netting 1993:59), his description of a household could easily be describing at least the myth of the communal kibbutz:

The household is the scene of economic allocation, arranging collectively for the food, clothing, and shelter of its members, and seeking to provide for those needs over the long term with some measure of security against the uncontrollable disruptions of the climate, the market economy, and the state (Netting 1993:59).

With the addition of Netting's description of household work systems, one could substitute "kibbutz" for "household" and be close to the almost universal descriptive phrase for the kibbutz social economy: From each according to his ability, to each according to his need.

The kibbutz myth, then, compares favorably with Netting's vision of smallholders at least in part. The similarity might be enough to explain why the kibbutzim seem to have been successful, despite Netting's negative expectations for collective farming. Degania, the first kibbutz, will celebrate its 90th year in 1999 (Weintraub et al. 1969:68). While kibbutzim represented only 18% of the agricultural workforce in 1962, they contributed between 28 and 30% of the national agricultural product (Darin-Drabkin 1962:233). This apparent success is in opposition to not only Netting's analysis of cooperative agriculture, but also the historical record of such ventures.

The most tragic example of the failures of collective agriculture can be seen in the recent history of Chinese agriculture. Under the Communist system, mismanagement of food production and unequal distribution caused massive rural famines. Other examples, such as the collective farms in the Soviet Union, have also shown that collective, intensive agriculture simply does not work.

How do the kibbutzim fit into this picture? The mythical kibbutz resembles Netting's descriptions of smallholders and would seem to contradict the realities of collective farming elsewhere. The myth tells only part of the story, however, and the reality is very different. The reality of the kibbutzim is that they are not truly agricultural, that what agriculture they do is not intensive, that they are increasingly less communal (and therefore less and less like a household), and that they are economic disasters.

Although most people think of a kibbutz as a farm, this is not the case for most kibbutzim. The original goal of the kibbutzim was to be economically self-sufficient. To Shlomo Lavee, one of the founders of the kibbutz movement, this meant that the kibbutzim should

strive for maximum development of every square kilometer, cultivate and utilize it to the full, incorporating all the sectors of the country's economy. This involves diversified economic areas, diversified farming which comprises agriculture and industry. Industry in the kibbutz enables...maximum employment for the Labor force of the settlement all through the year...(quoted in Weintraub et al. 1969:72, emphasis added).

There was an agricultural branch at every kibbutz, of course, and they were founded on the principle of mixed farming. Ein Harod, an early kibbutz in the Jezreel Valley, raised "field and fodder crops, orchards, vegetable gardens, chicken runs, and dairy" (Weintraub et al. 1969:90). Ein Harod's agricultural branch was given first priority, but the industrial "workshops expanded and developed and became an important factor in the kibbutz's economy" (Weintraub et al. 1969:91).

Industry has become an important factor in the economies of most kibbutzim today. Most early industry produced items needed by the agricultural branch or value-added agricultural products (Weintraub et al. 1969:91). That has since changed and by the end of the 1970s

more than two-thirds of the Kibbutzim (and almost all of the older Kibbutzim) had at least one industrial concern. There was never doubt that the industrialization of the Kibbutz would be at the expense of agriculture. In the mid-70s, there was already talk that it was desirable for the Kibbutz to employ at least a third of its labor force in agriculture, for otherwise the Kibbutz would lose its specific coloration (Kimmerling 1983: 125).

Besides industrial factories, kibbutzim run ulpanim (three to six month, intensive Hebrew courses) and museums (Katriel 1997) and are responsible for subtitling all foreign movies shown in Israel. One of the newest kibbutzim, Naot Smadar, founded in 1988, has very little to do with agriculture at all:

Some members teach at the regional school and in Eilat. Others opened a souvenir shop at nearby Ovda Air Base....The kibbutz also operates businesses, producing documentary films for Israel television and an expanding market; the building crews...also contract to carry out renovations in Negev kibbutzim (Shurman 1995:19).

The kibbutz is also building an arts center. While Naot Smadar does raise date palms, pommelas, melons, and grapes, it is far from the idyllic picture of a communal farm, something that is true of more and more kibbutzim. A recent NPR segment (Weiner 1998) profiled two kibbutzim that have turned to tourism for income: one, near Tel Aviv, runs a Wet and Wild style water park; the other, in the Galilee, runs river rafting tours.

The final part of the myth that I want to discuss is the economic success of the kibbutzim. The long lifespan of the kibbutz movement and the significant contribution to national agricultural production mentioned above suggest that the kibbutzim are economically viable communal settlements. The reality presents a far different picture. Put very bluntly,

the kibbutz movement has been billions of shekels in debt for years, and no one needs a doctorate in economics to understand why: Dovi and Dalia's way of life, however noble-minded, was an experiment that, like other socialist brainstorms, flopped....economically, the kibbutz has always been a burlesque of sound business practice (Sorkin 1995:17).

Kibbutzim, as discussed further below, are provided with all necessary startup funds when they are first founded. What was not originally anticipated was that the kibbutzim would "always be on the government dole, subsidized...with the border settlements the most heavily supported" (Sorkin 1995:17). Exact amounts of government support are not readily available for kibbutzim, but an example of the funds given to one moshav will illustrate the extent of the economic disaster.

Kafr Zimri was founded in 1975 in the Jerusalem Corridor, with a peak population of 35-40 families in the years leading up to 1984 (Sherman and Schwartz 1991:168). After a contentious first few years, the moshav leadership withdrew from active involvement in the financial affairs of its members. This hands-off approach was disastrous. In the first five years of operation "the excess of expenditure over income totaled roughly $1,140,000" (Sherman and Schwartz 1991:169). Although the Settlement Agency stepped in after this period and the national moshav movement sent one of its own treasurers to manage the accounts, Kafr Zimri had lost another $700,000 and several member-families by 1984 (Sherman and Schwartz 1991:168-169).

There are several reasons for the economic failure of the cooperative agricultural experiments. There are no mechanisms to reward exceptional effort, jobs requiring special skills, or additional work time. All members earn the same compensation regardless of what work they do or how well they do it. Conversely, members are not harmed if they do work poorly. At Ramat David, one member failed to rinse out the milk-holding tanks after the morning disinfection twice in one week, contaminating two full milk runs from 250 cows. The kibbutz, not the individual member, absorbed the loss of this income. Unlike a smallholder, who receives the direct benefits from his work (Netting 1993:3), the kibbutznik's economic status does depend on the quality and quantity of his or her labor. Therefore, there is little or no incentive to work hard or even to work at all. Some kibbutzim are trying to change this by adopting different pay scales for different work (Weiner 1998).

Because of this lack of motivation, the kibbutz also deviates from Netting and Boserup's characterization of intensive agriculture as synonomous with high labor inputs. At Ramat David, members are rarely scheduled for more than 35 hours of work per week, time that includes breaks for breakfast, lunch, and coffee. When the kibbutz cotton fields needed to be prepared for planting, each member was required to work an additional four- hour shift in the cotton fields. This extra labor was not enough, but rather than require a second additional shift for members, the kibbutz paid local Palestinian laborers and any interested members an hourly wage to finish the work.

Perhaps the most important reason that the kibbutzim are not economically viable is that they don't have to be. Smallholders are dependent on the fruits of their labor. If they fail, there is no one to back them up. In their study of moshavim economies, Sherman and Schwartz conclude that the "expectation of emergency aid from public agencies weakens the pressure felt by members and management to conduct the cooperative's affairs in an efficient, orderly, and disciplined manner" (1991:170). Naot Smadar, the recently settled kibbutz in the Negev, openly admits that this is the case. In an interview, the kibbutz secretary bluntly states that the kibbutz was founded to learn " ' how the human brain can function in the wider sphere of community. Profit was secondary' "(Shurman 1995:19). She later repeats that "business success is not a primary goal" (Shurman 1995:19). If the kibbutzim are not even trying to be economically successful, it seems likely that the government support will have to continue.

This leads to two observations. One is that the kibbutzim do meet the general expectation that cooperative farming and intensive agriculture do not go together. The kibbutzim may well be producing food, but they are doing it at great expense to the Israeli government and various international Zionist organizations.

The second observation is that there must be some other purpose served by the kibbutzim in order for the government to continue to support a failing enterprise. Two works (Stone 1997; Stone and Downum n. d.) focusing on variations in or exceptions to classic Boserupian intensification offer some possible answers. They focus on the
political and defensive role of agricultural settlement patterns in areas where ethnic control over land use rights is contested. Stone uses the term "negative population pressure" to describe a situation in which "the prime obstacle to production is an insufficient number to exert control over land access" (1997:6). The establishment and continued existence of the kibbutzim is best explained in similar terms of territorial claims to land and defense of borders. < p>

Historical setting

The agricultural conditions they found on arrival in the country were primitive....Palestine...which had once been prosperous, was suffering from severe neglect, with large areas left to the destructive influence of natural forces. Fertile valleys were turned into swamps, ancient irrigation projects were covered with sand, and the mountain terraces built by toiling generations to prevent erosion crumbed away (1962:10-14).

In contrast to this view of Palestine as "a neglected, desolate land without a people" (Hadawi 1967:10), is the Palestinian view of the same time period:

...long before Zionist immigration began in 1920, Palestine was known as a citrus exporting country....in 1912- 1913, the Arabs had exported 1,608,570 cases of oranges to Europe....Every inch of fertile soil was used to full capacity; and more and more rocky patches were being turned into orchards and groves (Hadawi 1967:10).

These two views are not compatible and it is not possible to reconcile them to form a clear picture of the time period immediately preceding early Jewish immigration to Palestine. The argument, however, is one of the core issues in the ongoing Jewish - Palestinian conflict. Few data exist describing the number and size of Arab settlements in Palestine during this time, and Jewish accounts of rural settlements focus solely on Jewish rural settlements. The subsequent history of the Zionist movement, however, is well documented and can be examined without full knowledge of the pre-existing conditions.

Although modern Jewish immigration to Palestine began as early as 1881 (Darin-Drabkin 1962:19), it was not organized as a national, Zionist goal until 1896. In that year, Theodor Herzl called for the establishment of a Jewish state, saying, "Palestine is our ever-memorable historic home. The very name of Palestine would attract our people with a force of marvelous potency" (Herzl 1986 in Reich 1995:18). A year later, the first World Zionist Congress created the World Zionist Organization (WZO) and included the following statement in its official program:

The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law. The Congress contemplates the following means to the attainment of this end: 1. The promotion, on suitable lines, of the colonization of Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers. (Basle Program 1897 in Reich 1995:19).

The WZO turned this plan into action with the help of the Jewish National Fund, whose "blue box" donations raised 4 million pounds in 40 years for the purchase of land in Palestine (Jewish Agency for Palestine 1946:37-38). This subsidized immigration raised the Jewish population in Palestine to 57,000 by 1919 (Ulitzur 1940:40).

In 1920, the rate of immigration increased dramatically with the creation of Keren Hayesod (Palestine Foundation Fund) and the continued work of the Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayemeth LeIsrael) and the Jewish Agency of Palestine. The amount of money poured into funding immigration not including the purchase of land is staggering. From 1921 to 1938, the Jewish Agency alone spent over a million pounds solely on immigration costs such as inoculations, disembarkation fees, and traveling expenses (Ulitzur 1940:42). Estimates of total foreign investment are difficult because of the number of sources of external capital, but Kimmerling (1983:21) estimates that a total of 79 million Palestinian pounds (equivalent to British Sterling during the British Mandate) was invested in Palestine by Jews outside of Palestine from 1921-1939. During the same period, the Jewish population in Palestine rose from 83,790 in 1922 to 489,000 in 1940 (Ulitzur 1940:40).

With this increase in Jewish population came an increase in the tension between Arabs and Jews. Before the creation of the state, three major periods of rioting in 1920-21, 1929, and 1936-39 occurred, each time affecting Jewish settlement policy (Kellerman 1993:26). During this time, Palestine was still governed by a British Mandate, so most regional decision-making power lay with British diplomats. In the middle of the 1936-39 riots, the British government convened a commission to study the problem of growing Arab-Jew discontent. Their report, the Peel White Paper of 1937, was a fairly lengthy summation of the situation with a recommendation of Partition of Palestine, based on the belief that "...it seems probable that the situation, bad as it now is, will grow worse. The conflict will go on, the gulf between Arabs and Jews will widen..." (Peel White Paper 1937 in Reich 1995:46).

The Partition Plan included in the report was based on analysis of Arab:Jew population ratios in different regions of Palestine. Five cities, including Jerusalem, were excluded from the plan due to their very mixed ethnic populations. The Paper recommended population transfers from one area to the other because

...in the area allocated in our plan to the Jewish State...there are now about 225,000 Arabs. In the area allotted to the Arab State there are only some 1,250 Jews....The existence of these minorities clearly constitutes the most serious hindrance to the smooth and successful operation of Partition (Peel White Paper 1937:50-51).

The commission further recommended that Arabs and Jews should be restricted to buying land in their respective projected territories and that Jewish immigration to the "Arab Area" should be prohibited (Peel White Paper 1937:51). The report concludes with a prophetic sentiment:

"Half a loaf is better than no bread" is a particularly English proverb; and, considering the attitude which both the Arab and the Jewish representatives adopted in giving evidence before us, we think it improbable that either party will be satisfied at first sight with the proposals we have submitted for the adjustment of their rival claims (ibid).

It is during these uncertain decades that the first kibbutzim were established.

Zionism and Collective Agriculture

Though resident in far-off lands where climatic conditions differed widely from those in Palestine, the Jew continued to pray for rain and to intercede for dew at the seasons when the climate of Palestine demanded it but when such prayers were utterly meaningless in the land of his sojourn (Jewish Agency for Palestine 1946:17-18).

The agricultural nature of Judaism was prominent in early Zionist philosophy. In the early 1800s, influential Jewish thinkers "stressed that the Jew should return to physical work and agriculture and thus 'normalize' his existence" (Weitz and Rokach 1968:2).

Beginning in 1908, the World Zionist Organization set up and funded a settlement office in Palestine. The policies of its first director, Arthur Ruppin, eventually led to the widescale adoption of cooperative agriculture:

His policy laid down that agricultural settlement was to be conducted as a partnership between the settler and the settlement agency....The Zionist Organization had to make the land available on lease through the Jewish National Fund, enable the settler to reclaim the land and prepare it for cultivation, and provide him with the necessary investments in housing, livestock, equipment and seed....the settlers were free to choose the form of settlement they preferred, whether cooperative, collective, or any other (Weitz and Rokach 1968:5).

This new policy coincided with the second major wave of Jewish immigration, the Second Aliyah. Unlike the first wave, this group was made up primarily of well-educated Jews strongly influenced by the Russian revolution and interested in creating a society of workers: "a Jewish Homeland in which Jewish farmers worked their own land" (Weitz and Rokach 1968:6).

Combined with a desire for economic self-sufficiency, the ideals of a Jewish return to agriculture, the national ownership of land, and an interest in communal living created the necessary conditions for the establishment of cooperative agriculture. In 1909, the first kibbutz was settled at Degania.

Until 1936, according to Kellerman, it was this mode of lifestyle that was the most important factor in the choice of kibbutz as settlement type (1993:47). During this time, kibbutz agriculture focused on subsistence farming. A mixed economy of vegetables, grains, citrus, dairy, and poultry was recommended by the Settlement Agency for every kibbutz and most kibbutzim aimed for self-sufficiency, with a secondary focus on market production.

After that time, which is contemporaneous with widespread Arab rioting and the Peel White Paper, Kellerman associates the kibbutz with the expansion, marking, and defense of territory, with a concurrent decrease in the importance of self-sufficiency (Kellerman 1993:47). From 1937 to the present, Jewish settlement patterns have been affected by Palestinian Arabs; "it is a matter of fact that the expansion and development of Zionist settlement occurred in reaction to various periods of Arab hostility and violence (Kellerman 1993:25). The effect of the Peel White Paper was not the one hoped for by the British. Rather than limiting Jewish settlements to the area destined to become the Jewish State, the report served to point out to various Zionist organizations that "the establishment of Jewish settlements in the Western Galilee [and other Arab-majority areas] was imperative if there was to be a Jewish claim to that area of Palestine" (Rayman 1981:32-33). In the next three years, three kibbutzim and eight Haganna (Jewish defense forces) outposts were created in the western Galilee, along the Lebanese border (Kellerman 1993:214). "Settlements were to assist in the drawing and defense of future boundaries" (Kellerman 1993:56). The future Israeli prime minister, David Ben-Gurion summed it up this way:

First of all we have to purchase [land] in the Upper Galilee, close to the Lebanese border, and to put settlers immediately on the land. We have tod o everything in order to make it difficult to exclude the Galilee from our possession (quoted in Kellerman 1993:215). The Zionist goal of expanding Jewish populations is clear and unambiguous.

The Partition Plan set into action a kibbutz boom that increased the number of kibbutzim from 43 in 1935 to 127 in 1947 and 227 in 1956, when the boom ended (Kellerman 1993:61). The goals of this expansion are clear: "The socially compact, highly ideologically charged kibbutz was used as an intrusion tool. The moshav...was used to enhance settlement activity in areas already settled by kibbutzim" (Kellerman 1993:269).

Following the establishment of the state in 1948, kibbutzim were used to shore up the newly established borders for a few years, but only six new kibbutzim were established between 1956 and the Six Day War in 1967 (Kellerman 1993:61). With the territorial expansion following the annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967 and the Golan Heights in 1981, another mini-boom occurred, with 35 new kibbutzim and 66 new moshavim established between 1967 and 1985 (Kellerman 1993:61).

Conclusions: Settlement, Population, and Agriculture as Politics

Their role in expanding and maintaining Jewish control of land in Palestine made and continue to make the kibbutzim valuable despite the economic drain they represent to the Israeli government. Rather than being an exception to Netting's belief that collective agriculture cannot work, the kibbutz strengthens the argument. Although kibbutzim do produce, production figures mask the true economic failure of the collective system. In this case, the ecological functions of agriculture and settlement patterns are secondary factors in the settlement and success of the kibbutz.