

EUROPE

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The history and current activities of Muslims in Europe sharply challenge older notions of “Muslim societies.” The very idea of “Europe” as a cultural region rests on notions of its Christian roots, and the recent debates about the European Constitution testify to the continued strength of these notions. The medieval Papal efforts to rally Christians to fight Muslims in the Crusades depended on a sense of an infidel enemy opposed to Christendom, and this way of thinking has continued to shape European attitudes toward Muslims. And yet belying this idea is the long presence of Muslims in Europe: in southern Spain, the Balkans, Turkey, and Russia. The expansion of British, Dutch and French empires led European traders and rulers to live in and eventually control many long-standing Muslim societies, and immigration from these societies to all parts of Europe has redefined what it is to be European. Muslims also have begun to question ideas about boundaries between a land of Islam and the lands of non-Muslims as they have settled in large numbers across Europe and begun to build Islamic social and religious institutions.

Muslims become Europeans

Muslim empires left long-lasting legacies in many parts of Europe. The Ottoman expansion into the Balkan Peninsula led to many conversions to Islam, and Islam remains the majority religion in Albania and in Bosnia and Herzegovina (and in Turkey, which for the moment is considered to straddle the border between Europe and Asia). Slightly northward, the majority of peoples in the Volga region of Russia, certainly part of Europe, are Muslim as well. In Andalusia, not only was a particularly rich Islamic heritage developed during Muslim rule (711–1492), but today many in Spain reclaim this Muslim heritage. Muslims ruled Sicily from the seventh to the ninth centuries and had communities elsewhere in today’s Italy. These long-standing Muslim-majority parts of Europe have left a two-fold legacy in European thinking. On the one hand, they place into question the prevailing notion that Europe is defined by a Christian heritage. On the other hand, they have long defined the frontiers of Europe, and this sense of boundaries is only strengthened today by the idea that a civilizational divide separates Latin Christendom, on one side, and both Orthodoxy and Islam, on the other.

Turkey’s candidacy for the European Union is, of course, the major challenge to this idea of a boundary between Christendom and the “Muslim World.” Many do not realize that Turkey already belongs to the Council of Europe, and by this fact comes

under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. Indeed, many of the recent key cases concerning religious freedom heard by the Court have come from Turkey. Turkey is thus already part of one legal version of “Europe.”

Europe’s own colonial expansions outwards and the resulting migrations back to the metropole further challenged notions of boundaries between Europe and Muslim lands. Three moments define these broad political, cultural, and demographic shifts: the building of empires, the recruitment of labor, and the settlement of Muslim families in Europe.

Colonization and empire building meant that Muslim-majority societies became in some sense part of Europe, in ways that differed by colonial policies. France tended toward a policy of assimilation; the Netherlands tried to maintain a strict separation of colonizer and native; Britain’s policy lay somewhere in between. When in the 1830s France made Algeria into French territory, all its inhabitants became French nationals, not merely subjects, and the dominant lines of French policy aimed to develop Muslims to the point where they could become full French citizens. At the other extreme, Dutch rulers of Indonesia forbade the use of Dutch in courts and offices, trying to preserve the distinction between European and native. British paternalism meant that the colonizers encouraged the spread of English and of British culture in Asia, (as in Macaulay’s reforms of the 1830s), but also preserved a racial dividing line. These distinct policies of colonial governance had profound effects on subsequent Muslim immigration to Europe.

By the end of the nineteenth century, small numbers of Muslims had begun to settle in Europe. France made the earliest and most concerted effort to import male labor onto its European soil to work in its factories. Indeed, France proclaimed itself “a great Muslim power,” seeking to develop French territory in Mecca as well as in North and West Africa, and built the Paris Mosque in the 1920s in part to proclaim its new role. South Asians migrated to Britain in the late nineteenth century: sailors came after the 1869 opening of the Suez Canal, and students sought higher education in the cities. The Netherlands governed the largest Muslim colony, the Dutch East Indies, today’s Indonesia, and most Muslim immigrants prior to the 1950s were from the Indies or from Surinam. But there were few of them, and the new wave of Muslims moving to the Netherlands in the 1970s and 1980s were from Morocco and Turkey and had no colonial ties with their host country.

Large-scale movement of Muslims to Europe began after the World War II, as the demand for unskilled labor far outstripped the European supply. Shortly after the war’s end, Britain gave free entry to Commonwealth residents. As a result, increasing numbers of Muslims, largely from Kashmir and what is today Bangladesh, followed kinsmen to Britain. By the early 1960s Britain was debating new limits on migration; these debates had the effect of speeding up migration and settling of families in Britain’s cities. Immigrants settled where they had relatives, producing concentrations of people from one village or lineage in certain neighborhoods of Birmingham, Bradford, or East London. In France, the Algerian War (1954–62) led many French Algerians to settle in the metropolis, and, given the uncertainties produced by the war, to settle with their families rather than engage in circular migration, much as happened in Britain. By the late 1960s, new populations of Muslims from North Africa and Turkey were moving into the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries.

In the aftermath of worldwide recession in 1973–4, European countries severely

limited labor migration. Ironically, one major result was to increase still further the proportion of people who settled with families. After restrictive laws were put into place in the mid-1970s, the two major ways to gain legal entry to Europe were to join a close family member already enjoying legal residence, or to claim asylum on grounds of conflict or persecution. In those areas of Europe that had experienced relatively little earlier labor immigration, including the Scandinavian countries and Italy, asylum seekers make up a relatively large proportion of the Muslim population.

These distinct migration histories produced widely differing sociological profiles of Muslims across Europe. Muslims coming to France or Britain were much more likely to know something of the host country's language than were Muslims arriving in Denmark or Austria. Non-Muslim French or British residents also were more likely to have had past interactions with Muslims, particularly for French who had spent time in Algeria. Spanish Muslims have come overwhelmingly from neighboring Morocco, and they have maintained close ties with their home country. Turkish Muslims arriving in Germany may have known some German language because of the long history of labor migration from Turkey to Germany. But Moroccans traveling to the Netherlands or Norway, or Senegalese arriving in Italy, were and are unlikely to arrive with more than a smattering of words in their new country of residence, and their hosts are, in turn, unlikely to know much about Morocco or Senegal (see the essays in Hunter 2002 and in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 2004).

These differences in turn favored the development of ethnic enclaves in those countries with little prior Muslim presence, and exacerbated difficulties of integration even for Muslims born in their new countries. Today we see the sharpest conflicts on religious grounds precisely in those counties where, either because of multicultural policies or because of an absence of shared cultural knowledge, Muslims live apart from others.

Recognizing Muslims in Europe

The children of the major wave of Muslim immigration came of age in the 1980s and began to demand public recognition of their religion. They did so at the very moment when the rise of what came to be called "political Islam" elsewhere in the world – Khomeini in Iran, new political movements in North Africa and the Middle East – stoked fears about Islam in Europe. Debates about the character of European Islam thus began at about the same time as the rise of a strong anti-immigrant trend in many countries, and the rise of anti-Islamic sentiment.

It is difficult to say how many Muslims live in Europe in the early twenty-first century, because many states do not keep such records and because it is unclear how one would wish to define a "Muslim." The numbers are themselves the objects of controversy: if there are fewer Muslims, then perhaps the government need not overly exert itself on their behalf. Some states produce numbers based on highly debatable methods. Neither France nor Germany, for example, keeps counts of residents by religion. The German government estimates its Muslim population by counting immigrants from Muslim-majority countries, thereby ignoring Muslims who are German citizens or who come from other states (such as Russia), and counting Christians from Lebanon or Syria. French state agencies make estimates in similar ways,

but also offer survey data suggesting that few Muslims are regular practitioners of their religion and that the “real” Muslim population is thus quite low.

Organizations

In each country, Muslims have tried to create new religious institutions and to open up space within preexisting institutions to allow Muslim participation. They have sought to create religious schools and asked for recognition of Islamic history and the right to wear Islamic dress in public schools. They have sought to build mosques that would be public reminders of the new, permanent Muslim presence. They also have sought accommodations in a number of other domains, from food preparation to cemeteries, to permit them to follow Islamic norms in their new societies.

Efforts to create Muslim representative organizations to manage these issues have reflected country-specific political traditions and the nature of the Muslim population. French centralizing traditions and the tradition of the “Gallican church” led the state to create a single, national body for Muslims, the French Council for the Muslim religion. This Council suffers from a fundamental ambiguity: does it represent religious authority, or the range of interests of all Muslims? It cannot easily claim the former, as its leaders are not trained in Islamic studies, and it has difficulty claiming the latter, as mosques selected its members, and many Muslims do not attend mosques.

By contrast, Muslims living in Britain first organized locally. They realized that they could become members of local community councils or create their own community organizations and thereby effect changes in schools and neighborhoods. Some British municipal councils welcomed, and indeed subsidized, Islamic community associations. Although Muslims later created a number of national organizations, most notable the Muslim Council of Britain, their success in lobbying for the inclusion of Islamic religious materials and *ḥalāl* meat in local schools has largely been due to local mobilization.

In Germany, most of the issues affecting Muslims are decided at the level of the states (*Länder*). German state governments require that religious communities be constituted as at least private associations, if not public ones, before they can ask for their religion to be taught in the public schools. (Having religious education in school is a right guaranteed by the German Constitution.) However, many German judges and officials, faced with what they find to be a confusing welter of Muslim affiliations – Alevīs and Aḥmadī as well as Shīʿīs and Sunnīs – and forgetting how complex Protestant Christian denominational distinctions can be, have required that Muslims agree among themselves about Islamic textbooks before they can enjoy that right. The result has been a stalemate in most parts of Germany.

Efforts to organize national Islamic bodies encounter not only the difficulty of bringing Muslims of diverse backgrounds together but also the fact that many Muslims identify strongly with transnational religious associations. Some of these, such as the various local associations sponsored by the Turkish government, are explicitly linked to a Muslim-majority country, and thus introduce a foreign element to domestic policy issues. Others, such as the Tablīghī Jamāʿat, have no particular country affiliation, but emphasize the primary responsibility of Muslims to the worldwide *umma* (see Masud 1999). The extreme example of what we could call

these anti-nationalist Islamic movements is the Hizb ut-Tahrir, which calls for Muslims to refrain from participating in secular politics and to work for the re-establishment of the caliphate.

Throughout Europe, Ṣūfī organizations maintain ties to spiritual leaders residing elsewhere, usually in Muslim-majority countries in Africa or Asia. For example, the Mouride order, founded in the 1880s by Sheykh Amadou Bamba, is centered in Senegal, where its followers consider the mosque to be the Mecca of West Africa. The order maintains close ties among followers living in Europe and North America through local associations and through periodic visits by the current head of the order (the founder's son). Trade and spirituality pass along these networks, although they are open to others from West Africa as well.

An Iranian order, the Shahmaghsoudi, illustrates another geographical possibility: centering an order in the diaspora. Founded in California, the order includes over 75 lodges throughout the world and was created to provide alternative forms of Islam to those promoted by the Iranian Revolution. At the same time, it taps into the centuries-old Oveyssi Ṣūfī tradition. Whereas Senegalese Mourides take their affiliation with them as they move out into other parts of the world, Iranians already in exile came to the Shahmaghsoudi order as a way to recapture something of their Iranian spiritual heritage (see essays in *Journal* 2004, and Werbner 2003).

A third possibility is illustrated by a lodge north of Paris simply called the “Sufi and Cultural Association,” who acknowledge as their teacher a Ṣūfī master living in Tunisia and part of the al-ʿAlawiyya order. The active participants are French men of origins in diverse Muslim-majority countries who grew up together and converted to the Sufi path as an alternative to drugs and delinquency.

Alongside these and other religious-based organizations are ethnic ones, such as the various associations of Turks in Germany, of Kashmiris in Britain, or of Senegalese in Italy. In these countries ethnic-based associations can bring together people of differing religious affiliations and at the same time provide a more open route to interaction with members of the host country.

Institutions

Because the large Muslim presence in Europe is of relatively recent date, the institutions Muslims most rely on for religious practice and education – most importantly, mosques, schools, and universities – are only now coming into existence. Other institutions whose services many Muslims find essential, such as banks that offer non-interest-bearing loans and slaughter houses that can supply *ḥalāl* meat in large quantities, are present in uneven fashion. European Muslim institutions are, it is safe to say, in their infancy.

Although mosques often have been flash points for opposition to an Islamic presence in Europe, if we consider only religious obligations special mosque buildings need not exist. Muslims can pray anywhere, and on the special occasions when Muslims should pray as a congregation – most notably Fridays and the two major feast-days – any large place will do. However, having a mosque is never just about prayer. The presence of a mosque – a public, religious-looking place, with the capacity to hold all who wish to worship – creates a Muslim presence in a village, a neighborhood, or a city. In many cities in Europe building a public mosque – a “cathedral

mosque” – has been the central focus of controversy. Mosques present city officials with political opportunities, from showing their hostility toward Islam to showing their willingness to work with Muslim residents. On the one hand, public figures in Britain and the Netherlands have labeled mosques as breeding grounds for hatred and terrorism; on the other, municipal leaders in Rotterdam, Marseille, and the Paris region have encouraged local committees to develop mosques that also would serve as cultural centers. Mosques often become signifiers in alternative semiotic frames developed by politicians: as symbols of “French Islam,” or of “multicultural Birmingham,” or of good neighborhood planning in Rotterdam.

Some European mosques are strongly associated with transnational organizations, such as the *Tablighī Jamāʿat* or the mosque networks controlled by the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs. The Algerian government exerts control over the Paris mosque. Mosques, of course, are supposed to be open to all Muslims who wish to worship, but some mosques are mainly frequented by Muslims from a particular country. In some cases, inter-community rivalries lead mosque committees to choose as *imām* someone from a third country – I know of several mosques with Moroccan, Tunisian, and Algerian worshippers that are led by men from the Comoro islands

The nature of schooling differs markedly from one European country to the next, of course, but nowhere have Muslims yet developed sufficient sources of education that satisfy their own demands. Britain has produced the highest relative number of Islamic private schools, over 100 by the early 2000s, but only a handful of these receive the state subsidies enjoyed by many Christian and Jewish schools. However, in some districts Muslim families have succeeded in introducing Islam as a subject matter alongside Christianity in the regular school curriculum. Britain’s proclaimed policies of promoting multiculturalism within schools has allowed Muslim girls to wear Islamic dress – as long as it matches the official school colors!

Germany emphasizes public education and it is difficult to gain permission for private schools. Because the Islamic associations in Germany have not reached agreement on a curriculum, schools do not provide a full-fledged program of instruction in Islam, as they do for religions of longer standing. The Netherlands emphasizes the rights of parents to choose schools, and subsidizes religious schools, as it had done for 46 Islamic primary schools by 2006.

France presents the most complex case. The long history of combat in France over the role of the Catholic Church in schooling produced sharp cleavages concerning the presence of religion in the public schools. This history predisposed teachers to be hostile toward Muslim girls’ wearing of Islamic head scarves. But private religious schools flourish. The twentieth-century compromise between the Republic and Catholics guaranteed state subsidies for private religious schools, and about 40 percent of French families make use of a private religious school at some time. Muslims have not yet (as of 2007) benefited from this possibility, but several schools are part-way toward receiving state subsidies.

Eating

Finally, Muslims have tried to develop ways of obtaining *ḥalāl* meat on an everyday basis and, on a massive scale, on the day of *ʿīd al-aḍḥā*, the “Feast of Sacrifice.” It is much more difficult in Europe than in Muslim-majority countries to put meat on the

Muslim table, because European rules of hygiene prohibit certain practices, and for the purely logistical reason that sheep are more likely to be far from where Muslims live. These problems have given rise to a near continual experimenting with different ways to certify practices as *ḥalāl* and to distribute meat quickly, and also to suggestions that Muslims reinterpret the rules to lighten the burden.

European law requires that animals be stunned before they are killed, on humanitarian grounds, but allows states to grant exemptions for religious practices. These exemptions were first granted to Jewish organizations; this precedent no doubt paved the way for Muslims. States that do grant these exemptions (which include all the countries of large Muslim minorities and exclude Scandinavia) are thereby obliged to license and regulate the process of ritual sacrifice in slaughter houses. In practice they may subcontract to mosques the right to license sacrificers, who then secure a considerable revenue. The certification of butcher shops and food production companies has itself become a major business line for Muslims.

Muslim legal opinion on the requirements for *ḥalāl* is not uniform. Some authorities argue that stunning is not allowed because it may kill the animal; others that it depends on the method. The famous lecturer Yūsuf al-Qaraḏāwī has argued that Muslims may accept meat from Christians and Jews, and that because Islam facilitates life, eating meat killed with stunning is acceptable.

Ever since Muslims began to arrive in large numbers in Europe after World War II, local authorities have tried to develop acceptable facilities to provide massive amounts of meat on the Feast of Sacrifice. Indeed, the story of the decades of experimentation belies the notion that European governments have ignored the problems surrounding integration of Muslims. In some counties, officials looked the other way when newly arrived Muslims would kill a sheep in the bathtub, or behind their home. It was easier to do so in Belgium, for example, where immigrants were more likely to live in a detached house, or in Britain, where South Asians had settled in ethnic enclaves, than in ethnically mixed apartment buildings in France. Some immigrants sent money back to their home countries instead, where their relatives could sacrifice in their name.

European Muslims faced a second problem as well. Muhammad had enjoined them to give a portion of the sacrificial meat to the needy, but who are the needy in France? Muslims may be poor, but many find that the households to their right and left also are able to afford to buy a sheep to sacrifice. In any case, in crowded urban settings, many find it difficult to locate people in a position to accept raw meat. This problem has added to the impulse to contribute to the home country, where, most believe, the needy are to be found in greater numbers.

Since the 1970s, mayors throughout Europe have worked with private companies and Islamic associations to find spaces where licensed sacrificers could kill animals en masse, or urged abattoir operators to devote one day to Muslim needs. In 2006, when the Feast of Sacrifice fell around New Year's Eve, Paris officials brokered deals between grocery chains and Muslim sacrificers: the former were able to produce large numbers of animals to a central point of sacrifice and to then prepare them quickly for purchase by Muslims.

Sacrifice's practical difficulties have led some Muslims to ask whether they can abstract from long-standing practices – and even from the Prophet Muḥammad's example – sacrifice's ethical message. Can ethics replace ritual, and should it do so in Europe?

Marrying and divorcing

The vast majority of Muslims follow the laws in place where they live regarding marriage and divorce. However, a small number of cases highlight the question of how Muslims should best articulate Islamic norms and European laws on family matters. Most famously, Muslims in Britain have constructed a kind of “English *shari‘a*” that adapts religious norms to British laws and is enforced informally. There and elsewhere, Islamic leaders have urged Muslims not to make the mistake of considering an “Islamic marriage” conducted before an *imām* but not registered with the state to be a legal marriage. Some young couples are creatively using both systems, marrying Islamically to satisfy their parents, and as an equivalent to an engagement, which does not exist in Islamic law. They then marry some time later. Yet a sufficiently large number of cases exist where women are abandoned and cannot divorce – because they never were married – for state and religious officials in several countries to actively discourage the practice.

Legally more complex issues arise with respect to marriage and divorce carried out abroad. Although at a very general level European countries recognize the legal validity of marriage and divorces carried out overseas, they may or may not recognize as valid the Islamic procedure of repudiation (*ṭalāq*) of a wife by her husband or a polygamous marriage. Some courts cite considerations of “public order” to deny recognition to some Islamic marriages and divorces carried out in other countries, depending on the substantive conditions. If the wife was present during a divorce hearing, for example, a court may accept a *ṭalāq* divorce.

Can European societies be Muslim?

Life in Europe raises long-standing questions about whether Muslims’ obligations to God change when they move to lands not ruled by Muslims. In the early centuries of Islam scholars developed a distinction between two realms, the *dār al-Islām* (abode of Islam), versus the *dār al-ḥarb* (abode of war). The former included the countries ruled under Islamic principles; the latter referred to all other places, where, presumably, Muslims would not be free to worship. Today, many Muslims find discomfort in this way of viewing the world. How is one to define “Muslim societies,” the *dār al-Islām*? Does one look to the correctness of the government, the piety of the people, or simply the fact that most people living in the country profess Islam as their religion? Is a majority-Muslim country whose government represses its people, and prevents the free expression of religious ideas to be considered part of *dār al-Islām*? Conversely, why should countries not governed by Islamic laws but where Muslims are free to worship be considered as belonging to an “abode of war?” As many Muslims in Europe began to think about religion in terms of the essentials of worship and spirituality, this category seemed increasingly out of date.

Some Muslims have proposed alternatives. Referring to the protection given to religious minorities by international law, some scholars have proposed *dār al-‘ahd*, “abode of treaty,” while others have proposed *dār al-dāwa*, “abode of predication,” or *dār al-shahāda*, “abode of witness,” emphasizing the possibilities open to Muslims in these lands. For many Muslims in Europe, the key issues are not labels – Muslim world versus non-Muslims lands – but of the social and cultural conditions for

Muslims to live fully satisfying lives as Muslims. Two categories of Muslims would not accept this proposition. Some consider religion a private matter not in need of new institutions, and hence see no particular challenge to living in Europe. Others consider it provisional to live anywhere but an Islamic state, a category that includes neither European nor most Muslim-majority countries.

The practical significance of this question emerged most recently regarding bank interest. One of the more pressing questions for Muslims who are planning to reside permanently in Europe is whether they may take out loans at interest to purchase homes. The Islamic prohibition against lending or borrowing at interest would seem to prevent them from so doing, but in the late 1990s some Muslims living in Europe put the question to the European Council for Fatwa and Research, a collection of jurists of various nationalities who now reside in Europe. The Council is led by the highly influential Egyptian jurist, Shaykh Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, who lives in Qatar. In 1999, the Council responded to the question in the form of a *fatwā*, a non-binding legal opinion issued by a qualified person or group. The jurists stressed that the prohibition on usury does mean that Muslims everywhere should take steps to avoid borrowing from banks that charge interest, and should devise alternative ways of financing homes, such as paying more than the stated price but in installments. However, if Muslims in Europe could not practice such alternatives, then they could take out a mortgage for a first house.

In their argument the jurists cited two considerations. First, the doctrine of extreme necessity (*darūra*) allows Muslims to do what otherwise is forbidden under compulsion or necessity. Why is it a necessity to own a house? Renting keeps the Muslim in a state of uncertainty and financial insecurity, stated the Council. Owning a house allows Muslims to settle in close proximity to a mosque, and to modify their house to accommodate religious needs. Moreover, Muslims living in Europe had reported to the Council that mortgage payments were equal to or lower than rents. Secondly, the jurists argued that while living in non-Muslim countries, Muslims may make contracts that violate Islamic law. Past jurists belonging to two of the traditional schools of Sunnī legal interpretation, the Ḥanafī and the Ḥanbalī, had made this argument, they said. Muslims cannot change the institutions that dominate life in their host countries, and thus they are not responsible for the existence of an interest-based financial system. If they were forbidden to benefit from banking institutions then Islam would have weakened them, a result that would contradict the principle that Islam should benefit Muslims.

The ruling did not change the traditional prohibition of lending at interest, but exempted Muslims living in Europe from the prohibition because of a combination of empirical circumstances: the importance of owning a house, the high level of rents, and the absence of viable alternatives. These circumstances allow the jurists to apply the principles that necessity allows for exemption, and that Muslims may use otherwise invalid financial instruments when they live in “non-Islamic countries.”

As noted earlier, in the late 1980s many Muslims in Europe shifted from seeing themselves, and being seen by others, mainly as immigrants, to taking on identities mainly as Muslims. Some Muslims and non-Muslims began to see religious commitments and practices as distinct from ethnic particularities and immigration histories. This shift has had a number of repercussions that have played themselves out over time and at different rhythms in different countries, but we can best understand these

changes as the creation of a number of new possibilities in self-identifications and in treatment by others. These new possibilities do not resolve to one single trend, such as “individualization,” but engender new tensions.

For Muslims, the shift has made possible several different ways of thinking about what it means to be a Muslim in Europe. For some, being a Muslim becomes a matter of faith and private religious practice, along the lines of older forms of European Protestantism. For others, it becomes a tradition to which they can refer, but to which they do not feel bound or obligated. Such, for example, is the position taken by self-styled “secular Muslims” in France. The opposite is equally possible; many Muslims have to come to see Islam as a set of norms and constraints that are detached from any one time or place and opposed to the traditions of various home countries. Muslims may see Islam in this last way and become highly involved in European public life, or, to the contrary, they can withdraw from public life on grounds that one can best live as a Muslim if one remains detached. These possibilities are all well represented among European Muslims today.

The “secular Muslim” approach is most present in France because the secularist media find this approach closest to proper French attitudes. Writers such as Malik Chebel promote in their books and through frequent television appearances an “enlightened Islam” that would consist of philosophy and spirituality, but eschew the legal and institutional aspects, which, he writes, do not fit well in Europe. “Self Islam” was the French title of a recent popular book that brings together the notions of religion as mainly and properly individual and internal. Several sociopolitical movements use the phrase “secular Muslims” (*Musulmans laïques*) and call for keeping Islam out of the public sphere, and eradicating beliefs and practices deemed inimical to the Republic. In this approach, individuality, privacy, *laïcité*, and European values are bundled.

What could be called the “public Muslim” approach argues that this bundle must be untied, and that the public presentation of Islam does not conflict with European values. The Swiss intellectual Tariq Ramadan (1999), for example, argues that at the level of values one can find a convergence between Islamic norms and those of Europe, and that to do this one need not abandon the ideal of a visible, public Islamic presence. (Ramadan also argues for a geopolitical strategy of encouraging this convergence within each distinct cultural or religious tradition.) The “young Muslim” movements once associated with Ramadan seek to change political life as coalitions of Muslims, rather than as coalitions of secular citizens. If the “secular Muslim” approach grows out of French secularism, the “public Islam” accords best with countries supporting a multicultural recognition of ethnic differences such as Britain.

Opposed to both these stances are separatists, either those who simply keep to themselves, such as the *Tablighī Jamāʿat*, or those that promote the eventual recreation of an Islamic state, such as the *Hizb ut-Tahrir* or its more radical offshoots. Muslims who are attracted to one of these movements make the same distinction between “religion” and “tradition” as do those who see themselves as “secularists” or as “publicly Muslim.” But whereas a figure such as Tariq Ramadan sees a way to adapt Islamic norms to Europe, on condition that Europe accepts Muslims’ public presence, the *Hizb ut-Tahrir* does not.

For non-Muslims, the shift in frames, from immigrants to Muslims, also can produce diverse effects. By and large, albeit unevenly, European governments have

moved toward recognizing Islam as a legitimate faith, deserving of the same recognition and resources as are accorded forms of Christianity and Judaism. At the same time, however, highlighting the religion of a certain segment of the population emphasizes an element that separates them from the majority population, religion, and places into the background cross-cutting elements that form the basis for allegiances and solidarity, such as occupations, political allegiances, or cultural interests.

As a result of these differences in migration histories, Muslims differ markedly across Europe in their own sense of identification. A 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Survey (2006) asked Muslims in different countries around the world to choose between religion and nationality as their primary identity. While 42 percent of French Muslims said they were French first and Muslim second, only 7 percent of British Muslims and 3 percent of Spanish Muslims put nationality first. (Pew reports that American Christians choose between religious and national identities in almost exactly the same proportion as do French Muslims.) These same differences also show up for the population of each country as a whole. When asked if there is a conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society, 74 percent of all French people said there was none, about twice as high a figure as that for other Europeans or Americans. Indeed, French people are more positive about modern Islam than are people in Indonesia, Jordan, or Egypt!

The distinctive feature of the French experience within Europe is that there, and there alone, both colonial history and current policies push in the same direction, towards integration. Today's French Muslims, or their parents or grandparents, came from former French territories in North or West Africa, where they learned that they were now part of the grand story of France, albeit in second-class roles. French Muslims today are demanding long-denied equal status and respect, as did African Americans in the USA. Their experience is quite unlike that of, say, Moroccans arriving in Denmark, where no common pasts, languages, or experiences prepare their way, or, for that matter, South Asians in Britain, who never were told that they could become English – and many of whom today demand a distinct mode of governance under *shari'a* law.

Nor do French Muslims live in ethnic enclaves. The housing projects around Paris contain people from different parts of Asia, Africa, and Europe, and stand in stark contrast to all-Turkish neighborhoods in Belgium and or all-Pakistani parts of British cities. Young Muslims who emerge from this mixed environment speak only French, demand French-language sermons in their mosques (and increasingly get them), and they flock to French-medium Islamic schools and institutes.

French policies also push toward integration, with a mix of carrots and sticks. Headscarves are out at school, but some enlightened mayors are giving land for mosques. The state gives newly arrived men and women hundreds of free hours of French language lessons, in an effort to make them more competitive for employment. Contrast recent Dutch policies (applied mainly to poorer counties) that require would-be immigrants, even the spouses of Dutch residents, to prove that they already speak good Dutch *before* arrival but provide no help in learning the language.

Whether Muslims living in Europe come to consider their countries of residence as part of the “Muslim World” may depend less on whether Islamic law ever gains official recognition, or Islamic private schools grow and flourish, than on whether they find themselves recognized as equal citizens. Or perhaps they will rephrase the

question, and suggest that there are no more Muslim and non-Muslim worlds or countries, but places where one is more or less respected in one's quality as a Muslim man or woman.

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