American Politics
Lecture 9/12/90
INSIDERS' STRATEGY
1. POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES.
2. ISSUE ADS
3. SOFT MONEY
4. LOBBYISTS
a. PAC CONTRIBUTIONS FROM
A GIVEN INDUSTRY GREATLY INCREASE DURING TIMES WHEN CONGRESS IS
CONSIDERING MAJOR LEGISLATION:
S&L CRISIS. CONTRIBUTIONS ROSE 42%
FROM 1987 TO 1988.
EVERY MEMBER OF THE HOUSE WHO RECEIVED $415,000 OR MORE FROM
SUGAR INTERESTS VOTED TO MAINTAIN THE SUGAR SUBSIDY.
b. THE INFLUENCE OF PAC MONEY IS GREATEST FOR THE LEAST PUBLICIZED
ISSUES:
MATHIAS- P. 413.
IT IS PROBABLY HAS THE LEAST IMPACT ON THOSE ISSUES FOR WHICH
MANY SIDES ARE HEARD FROM:
(AS SUGGESTED BY FEDERALIST #10):
54 OUT OF 208 MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WHO TOOK NRA MONEY VOTED
AGAINST THE NRA IN 1991.
INSIDER INTEREST GROUPS AND THE CLINTON HEALTH PLAN:
National Federation of Independent Business PAC:
$231,000 in 1991-92
to more than $1 million
in 1995-96.
Sierra Club ran ads praising
Conn. Congressman Jim Maloney for his votes in favor of clean
air legislation, and telling voters to call JimMaloney and tell
him to keep up the good work. Jim Maloney's campaign manager said,
"It causes all kinds of problems. You have a message you're
working on, and an independent group comes in and their message
is the message. We'd be better off if they were not allowed to
do it."
Business Roundtable, CEOs of nation's largest corps. Will pay
for $29 million.
Biggest use of issue ads was by AFL-CIO in 1996, when they
targeted freshmen Republicans who had come to office in 1994.
41% of issue ads are attack ads.
LIMITS ON INDIVIDUAL DONATIONS
TO CANDIDATES: $1,000
LIMITS ON INDIVIDUAL DONATIONS TO PARTY ELECTION COMMITTEES:
$20,000
LIMITS ON INDIVIDUAL DONATIONS FOR THE PURPOSE OF "STRENGTHENING
PARTY ORGANIZATION" (SOFT MONEY):
UNLIMITED!
| 1994 | 1998 | |
| NRSC | $2.5 | $14.5 |
| DSCC | $0.4 | $7.8 |
| NRCC | $2.2 | $14.3 |
| DCCC | $3.1 | $6.2 |
| NRSC | DSCC | ||
| Mirage Resorts | 25l | Connell Rice & Sugar | $200 |
| Freddie Mac | 200 | Oracle (software) | $194 |
| American Fin. (ins) | 195 | Buttenwieser | $160 |
| Phillip Morris | 175 | Philip Morris | $155 |
| RJ Reynolds | 120 | AT&T | $130 |
| CSX (rail) | 110 | Loral Space & Co. | $110 |
| Travelers (ins) | 110 | Yucaipa (retail) | $105 |
| Microsoft | 109 | Northern Telecomm | $100 |
| Blue Cross | 106 | MCI Telecomm. | $78 |
| RD Hubbard (race) | 105 | Rhone-Pounec (ag&drug) | $78 |
| Tobacco Institute | 100 | Anheuser-Busch | $72 |
| Circus Circus | $100 | Tobacco Institute | $70 |
LOBBYIST FOR THE DUTKO GROUP
PH.D. IN PUBLIC POLICY FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.
SPECIAL EXPERTISE IN TAX POLICY.
CLIENTS:
FEDERAL EXPRESS
SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE
PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES
UNION PACIFIC.
ANDRES HAS PERSONALLY RAISED $250,000 PER YEAR.
CHAIRED FUNDRAISING DINNER COMMITTEES FOR
NRCC SINCE 1995.
THE UNICEF GAME
A $200 contribution
to UNICEF will transform a sickly 2 year old into a healthy 6
year oldprobably save its life.
In discussion sections this week,
you will have a chance to make a donation (say $1.00).
If less than $100 is raised, I will send it on to UNICEF.
If more than $100 is raised, I will send it on and add $200.
Discussion points for UNICEF GAME.
-The extra $200 is in the nature of a public good.
OTHERS' DONATIONS
more than $100 less than $100
contribute $1 B-$1 -$1
YOU
free-ride B 0
n Free-riding is "almost" a dominant strategybecause
other could donate between $99 and $100then your contribution
makes a difference. The larger the group, the less likely the
individual's contribution will make a difference to the provision
of the public good.
--What political activities is this like? Votingsmall chance
your vote will make a difference to the success of the candidate.
Collective action in large groups.
--Would selective incentives work in UNICEF game? What incentives?
Would they be appropriate?
--Do different people have different evaluation of the public
good (Gary's $200)? What difference does that make to successful
political action?