Seminar Times: Tuesdays 4-7pm
Instructor: Gillian Russell
My office: 209 Wilson Hall
Office hours: Thursdays 3-4pm
Email: grussell - at - wustl - dot - edu
E-reserves site for this course: http://eres.wustl.edu/eres/coursepage.aspx?cid=1934&page=docs
Course Website: http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~grussell/Phil521.html
The aim of this seminar will be to examine ideas and issues in the philosophy of language which have relevance for debates in epistemology. We will focus on three main topics: 1) the analytic theory of the a priori, 2) two dimensionalism and 3) contextualism about knowledge attributions. Readings will be a mixture of classic 20th century literature (Carnap, Quine, Kripke, Unger etc.) and very recent work in these areas (Tim Williamson, Scott Soames, John MacFarlane, Jason Stanley etc.)
If you decide to take this seminar it would be worth purchasing copies of the following texts:
The Ways of Paradox, W. V. O. Quine, Harvard University Press (Cambridge, Mass., 1966)
Ignorance: A case for Scepticism, P. Unger, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 1975)
Reference and Description, S. Soames, Princeton University Press (Princeton, 2005)
Knowledge and Practical Interests, J. Stanley, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 2005)
No pre-assigned reading (but I will be handing out some passages from Kant in class).
Locke - "Trifling Propositions" in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (on e-reserve)
Frege - Selections from the Foundations of Arithmetic (on e-reserve)
Carnap - "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology" (on e-reserve)
Recommended extra reading:
"Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism," John MacFarlane, The Philosophical Review 111 (2002), 25-65, (available through Jstor).
"Truth by Convention" in The Ways of Paradox, W. V. O. Quine, Harvard University Press (Cambridge, Mass., 1966)
"Carnap on Logical Truth" in The Ways of Paradox, W. V. O. Quine, Harvard University Press (Cambridge, Mass., 1966)
"It Ain't Necessarily So", H. Putnam, Journal of Philosophy, 53:658 - 71, available through Jstor.
"Two Dogmas of Empiricism", W.V.O. Quine, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 60, No. 1. (Jan., 1951), pp. 20-43, available through Jstor.
Recommended extra reading:
"The Death of Meaning", G. Harman, in Reasoning, Meaning and Mind, OUP, (Oxford: 1999) (on e-reserve)
"Analyticity Reconsidered", P. Boghossian, Nous 30(3): 360-391, available through Jstor.
"In Defence of a Dogma", H.P. Grice and P. F. Strawson, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 65, No. 2. (Apr., 1956), pp. 141-158, available through Jstor.
"Analyticity Regained?", G. Harman, Noûs, Vol. 30, No. 3. (Sep., 1996), pp. 392-400. This paper is available through Jstor, also in Reasoning, Meaning and Mind, OUP, (Oxford: 1999).
"Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages", R. Carnap, appendix to Meaning and Necessity: A study in semantics and modal logic (2nd Edition) (Chicago 1947) (on e-reserve)
Chapter 2 of Word and Object, Quine (will be going on e-reserve)
Recommended extra reading:
"Skepticism about Meaning: Indeterminacy, Normativity, and the Rule-Following Paradox", Scott Soames, Canadian Journal of Philosophy (1997), pages 211-249, Sup. Vol. 23
Lectures 1 and 2 of Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke,
Blackwell (2003)
Pages 1-42 of Reference and Description, S. Soames, Princeton University Press, (Princeton, 2005)
Recommended extra reading:
"The Modal Argument: Wide Scope and Rigidified Descriptions", Scott Soames, Noûs, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Mar., 1998), pp. 1-22
Kaplan - Demonstratives, in Themes from Kaplan, edited by Joseph Almog, John Perry and Howard Wettstein. (This reading is especially long and dense, but mastering it will repay handsomely for the rest of the course; I recommend devoting a bit more time than usual to this one.)
"Assertion", chapter 4 of Context and Content, Robert C. Stalnaker, Oxford Cognitive Science (New York, 1999), (also on e-reserve).
Recommended extra reading:
"Two Notions of Necessity", Martin Davies and LLoyd Humberstone, Philosophical Studies 38 (1980), pages 1-30 (this will be going on e-reserve.)
Chapters 5 and 6 of Soames' Reference and Description: "Stalnaker's Two Dimensionalist Model of Discourse" and "The Early Two-Dimensionalist Semantics of Davies and Humberstone."
"Reference and Description Revisited" Frank Jackson, Noûs, Vol. 32, Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives, 12, Language Mind and Ontology. (1998), pp. 201-218.
"The Foundations of Two Dimensional Semantics", David Chalmers, in Two-Dimensional Semantics, edited by Manuel Garcia-Carpintero and Joseph Macia, Oxford University Press, (Oxford, 2006) (on e-res)
"Cosmic Hermeneutics", Alex Byrne, Nous, 1999, available through Jstor.
"Critique of Ambitious Two Dimensionalism", Chapter 10 in Reference and Description, Scott Soames
Pages 1-6 and 47-91 of Ignorance, P. Unger, Oxford University Press, (Oxford, 1975)
"Elusive Knowledge", David Lewis, (on e-reserve)
Pages 1-46 of Knowledge and Practical Interests, Jason Stanley
Recommended extra reading:
Pages 47-73 of Knowledge and Practical Interests, Jason Stanley
"Knowing How and Knowing That", chapter 2 of The Concept of Mind, Gibert Ryle (on e-reserve)
Stanley and Williamson, "Knowing How, Knowing That" - http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/%7Ejasoncs/JPHIL.pdf
There are two assessment options if you would like to receive a grade for the seminar. The first is to submit 2 research papers of around 3000 words (max 5000 words), the first by Thurdsay 19th October, the second by 11th December (the last day of classes). The second will be to complete three out of four short assigned problem sets (you will have a week to complete each assigned set) during the course, and one research paper of around 3000 words (max 5000 words). Problem sets will be varied and may include historical, technical and philosophical questions, but the questions will tend to be quite focused, e.g.
Q. Describe three differences between Kant and Frege's conceptions of analyticity.
Q. Is [][the evening star] =the evening star a theorem of Kaplan's logic of demonstratives? Explain your answer.
Q. What is the epistemic argument against descriptivism?
Research papers should consist in the defence of an original contribution to the literature on the topics we have been discussing. I recommend coming to see me to discuss your paper plan before you begin writing.
I consider both assessment options to be on a par; the choice between them is really just one of personal taste.
Many, though not all, of the readings for this course are quite difficult, and the chances are you'll find the course easier if you already have a background in logic, philosophy of language or epistemology. However my hope is that the course can be accessible to
even to graduate students whose attentions have been directed elsewhere until now. If you find that you are continually lost, come and see me and we'll try to work out what you're missing and a way to get you back on track with the seminar
Any cases of suspected plagiarism, or other problems with academic integrity, will be reported to the Dean in his role as head of the academic integrity committee, with the recommendation that, if found guilty, the student fail the course.