PUBLICATIONS
José
Luis Bermúdez
Authored books;
Edited books; Guest editorships; Academic
journal papers; Contributions to edited works; Encyclopedia
articles; Reviews; Electronic journal
articles; Foreign language publications
Authored
Books
J. L. Bermúdez,
The
Paradox of Self-Consciousness (MIT Press. Representation and Mind
series. June 1998. Paperback 2000. Portuguese translation 2001)
J. L. Bermúdez,
Thinking
without Words (In press, OUP USA. Publication date March 2003)
J. L. Bermúdez,
Philosophy
of Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge, Forthcoming
May 2005)
Edited
Books
J. L. Bermudez, A. J. Marcel
and N. Einesslan (eds.)
The
Body and the Self (MIT Press, 1995. Paperback 1998)
J. L. Bermúdez and
A. Millar (eds.), Reason
and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality (OUP UK, 2002)
J. L. Bermúdez and
S. Gardner (eds.), Art
and Morality (Routledge, 2002)
J. L. Bermúdez and
F. Macpherson (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Contemporary Readings
(under contract to Routledge)
J. L. Bermúdez, Thought,
Language, and Experience: Themes from the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. (OUP.
Forthcoming May 2005)
Guest Editorships
J. L. Bermudez and M. E.
Elton (guest editors), Personal
and Subpersonal: Essays on Psychological Explanation. Special issue
of Philosophical Explorations (Jan. 2000)
J. L. Bermúdez, Self-Consciousness.
Special issue of The Monist (April 2004)
Academic
Journal Papers
• ‘The adequacy of simple Ideas
in Locke - A rehabilitation of Berkeley’s criticisms’ in The Locke Newsletter
23 (1992), 25-58
• ‘Peacocke’s
Argument against the Autonomy of Nonconceptual Content’
in Mind and Language 9 (December 1994), 203-218. Reprinted in Y.
Gunther (Ed.),
Theories of Nonconceptual Content, MIT Press, 2003.
• ‘The
unity of apperception in the Critique of Pure Reason’
in European Journal of Philosophy 2, (December 1994), 213---240
• ‘Is the Postmodern World
a Nietzschean World?’ in Intenational Studies in Philosophy 27 (April
1995), 1-14
• ‘Scepticism
and the Justification of Transcendental Idealism’
in
Ratio
8 (June 1995), 1-23
• ‘Scepticism and Subjectivity:
Two Critiques of Traditional Epistemology Reconsidered’
International
Philosophical Quarterly 35 (June 1995), 141-158
• ‘Syntax,
Semantics and Levels of Explanation’,
Philosophical Quarterly 45 (July 1995), 361-367
• ‘Aspects
of the Self (John Campbell’s Past, Space and Self)’
Inquiry 38 (September 1995), 1-15
• ‘Transcendental arguments
and psychology’, Metaphilosophy 26 (October 1995), 379-401
• ‘Nonconceptual
Content: From Perceptual Experience to Subpersonal Computational States’
in Mind and Language 10 (December 1995), 333-369. Reprinted in Y.
Gunther (Ed.), Theories of Nonconceptual Content, MIT Press, 2003.
• ‘The
moral significance of birth’, Ethics
106 (January 1996), 378-403
• ‘Locke,
Property Dualism and Metaphysical Dualism’,
British
Journal for the History of Philosophy 4 (September 1996), 223-245
• ‘Defending Intentionalist
Accounts of Self-Deception’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (March
1997), 107-108.
• ‘Practical understanding
vs reflective understanding’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
67 (September 1997), 635-641
• ‘Nietzsche and the Tradition’,
British Journal for the History of Philosophy (September 1997),
402-414
• ‘Reduction and the Self’,
Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (October 1997), 458-466. Reprinted in
J. Shear and S. Gallagher (eds.), Models of the Self (Thorverton,
Imprint Academic 1999).
• ‘Scepticism
and science in Descartes’, Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research 58 (December 1997), 743-772.
• ‘Philosophical psychopathology’,
Mind and Language 13.2 (June 1998), 287-307.
• ‘Levels of scepticism in
the First Meditation’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy
6 (September 1998), 237-245.
• ‘Naturalism
and conceptual norms’,
Philosophical Quarterly 49 (January 1999), 77-85
• ‘Cognitive impenetrability,
phenomenology and nonconceptual content’
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
22, 367-368.
• ‘Psychologism
and Psychology’,
Inquiry
42 (October 1999), 487-504
• ‘Rationality
and the backwards induction argument’,
Analysis
59 (October 1999), 243-248
• ‘Personal
and Subpersonal: A Difference without a Distinction’,
Philosophical Explorations 2 (January 2000), 63-82
• ‘Consciousness,
higher-order thought and stimulus-reinforcement learning: Comments on Rolls’s
The Brain and Emotion’,
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (April 2000), 194-195
• ‘Rationality,
logic and fast and frugal heuristics: Review of Gigerenzer et al’,
Behavioral
and Brain Sciences 23 (October 2000), 744-745
• ‘Self-deception,
intentions and contradictory beliefs’, Analysis 60 (October
2000), 309-319
• ‘Naturalized
Sense Data',
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (October 2000), 353-374
• ‘The
originality of Cartesian scepticism’, History
of Philosophy Quarterly 17 (October 2000), 333-360
• ‘Frege
on thoughts and their structure’ Philosophiegeschichte
und logische Analyse 4 (January 2001), 87-105
• ‘Bodily self-awareness
and the will: Reply to Power’ Minds and Machines 11 (February 2001),
139-142
• ‘Normativity
and rationality in delusional psychiatric disorders’,
Mind and Language 16 (November 2001), 457-493
• ‘Nonconceptual
self-consciousness and cognitive science’,
Synthese 129 (October 2001), 129-149.
• ‘Sources
of self-consciousness’, Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society 102 (January 2002), 87-107
• ‘Ascribing thoughts to
non-linguistic creatures’ forthcoming in Facta Philosophica (special
issue on Belief Ascription edited by Marina Sbisa and Chris Gauker)
•”I”-thoughts and
explanation: Reply to Garrett’, Philosophical Quarterly 53, 432-436
•‘Ascribing thoughts
to non-linguistic creatures’ Facta Philosophica 5 (special issue
on Belief Ascription edited by Marina Sbisa and Chris Gauker), 313-333
•‘Vagueness, phenomenal
concepts, and mind-brain identity’, Analysis 64, (April 2004), 134-139
Contributions
to edited works
• ‘Ecological self-perception
and the notion of a nonconceptual point of view’ in Bermúdez, Marcel
and Eilan (eds.) The Body and the Self, 153-174
• ‘The body and the self:
Interdisciplinary issues’ (co-author) in Bermúdez, Marcel and Eilan
(eds.) The Body and the Self, 1-28
• ‘Categorising colour experience:
Some problems’ in Proceedings of SimCat 1997. Technical Report of
the Edinburgh University Artificial Intelligence department, 9-13
• ‘The concept of decadence’
forthcoming in Bermúdez and Gardner (eds.)
Art and Morality
(Routledge)
• ‘Rationality without language’,
in Bermúdez and Millar (eds.)
Reason and Nature (OUP), 233-264.
• ‘Ascribing thoughts to
non-linguistic creatures’, forthcoming in M. Sbisa and C. Gauker (eds.),
Belief-Ascription
• ‘The elusiveness thesis,
immunity to error through misidentification, and privileged access’, forthcoming
in Self-Knowledge and Privileged Access, edited by B. Gertler (Ashgate
Epistemology and Mind series)
• ‘The
domain of folk psychology’,
forthcoming in Mind and Persons, edited by A. O’Hear (Cambridge
University Press)
‘Evans and the sense of “I”
forthcoming in Thought, Reference and Experience: Themes from the Philosophy
of Gareth Evans, edited by J. L. Bermúdez (Oxford University
Press)
‘How to argue for eliminativism’
forthcoming in Paul Churchland: Contemporary Philosophy in Focus,
edited by B. Keeley (Cambridge University Press)
‘Animal reasoning and proto-logic’,
forthcoming in Rational Animals, edited by S. L. Hurley and M. Nudds
(Oxford University Press)
‘Language and thought’ forthcoming
in Handbook to the Philosophy of Psychology, edited by J. Prinz
(Oxford University Press)
‘The phenomenology of bodily
perception’ forthcoming in Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind,
edited by A. L. Thomasson and D. W. Smith
Encyclopedia
articles
• ‘Nonconceptual content’. In
Macmillan Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science (4000 word essay)
• ‘Self-consciousness’, In
Macmillan Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science (4000 word essay)
• ‘Mental
content, nonconceptual’, In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Various entries forthcoming
in Oxford Companion to Philosophy
Reviews
• A. W. Price, Mental Conflict,
Mind 10 (April 1996), 357-362.
• M. Tiles and J. Tiles,
Introduction to Historical Epistemology, Philosophical Books 37
(April 1996), 124-125
• J. Kim, Supervenience and
Mind, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 3 (September
1995), 403-406.
• N.
Nelkin, Consciousness and the Origins of Thought, Philosophical
Books 39 (December 1998), 258-260
• P.
Carruthers and P. K. Smith (Eds.), Theories of Theory of Mind, Philosophical
Quarterly 45 (January 1999), 115-119
• E. J. Lowe, Subjects of
Experience, Philosophical Quarterly (May 1999), 272-275
• S.
Hurley, Consciousness in Action, European Journal of Philosophy
7 (April 2000), 106-110
• R. Tallis, Philosophical
Explorations, Times Literary Supplement (30 June 2000)
• Gottlob Frege, Idéographie
(French translation of Begriffsschrift), Dialectica 55 (January
2001), 67-72
• C.
Peacocke, Being Known, Philosophical Psychology 14 (June 2001),
250-256
• J.
Fodor, The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way, Philosophical Quarterly51
(October 2001), 549-552
• P.
Carruthers, Phenomenal Consciousness, Philosophical Quarterly
52 , 265-268
• A. Clarke, Sentience,
Mind
111 (July 2002), 653-657
Electronic
journal articles (refereed)
‘Nonconceptual
content and the nature of perceptual experience’ (with Fiona Macpherson),
Electronic
Journal of Analytical Philosophy 6 (1998)
‘Primitive
self-consciousness: Reply to Evans on Bermúdez’, Psycoloquy
11 (2000)
‘Circularity,
“I”-thoughts and the linguistic requirement for concept possession: Reply
to Fuller and Slater on Bermúdez’, Psycoloquy 11 (2000)
‘The
cognitive neuroscience of primitive self-consciousness: Reply to Gallese
on Bermúdez’, Psycoloquy 11
‘Direct
self-consciousness: Reply to Myin on Bermúdez’, Psycoloquy
11 (2000)
‘Concepts
and the priority principle: Reply to Robbins on Bermúdez’, Psycoloquy
11 (2000)
See also the electronic symposium
on The Paradox of Self-Consciousness (http://www.uniroma3.it/kant/field/bermudezsymp.htm).
The symposium contains replies to commentaries by Andrew Brook, José
Luis Díaz, Vittorio Gallese, Gianfranco Soldati
Foreign
Language Publications
Portuguese translation
of The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, February 2001
‘Tres niveles de racionalidad
animal’, Revista Mexicana de Psicología 16 (December 1999), 189-194.
‘Autoconciencia no conceptual’,
Ciencia 50 (September 1999), 16-28
‘Autoinganno, intenzioni
e credenze contraddittorie. Un commento a Mele’, Sistemi Intelligenti 3,
521-531
Nichtbegriffliche Selbstfahrung
und das Paradox des selbstbewusstseins’ in Selbst und Gehirn, hg. von A.
Newen und K. Vogeley (Paderborn, Mentis-Verlag)
‘La Conciencia’ in Gran Enciclopedia
Larousse 4th Edition (Aleph, Barcelona, forthcoming)