

**ASPECTS OF THE SELF: A CRITICAL NOTICE OF JOHN CAMPBELL'S PAST,
SPACE AND SELF***

John Campbell's impressive book undertakes to map out the central conceptual skills that make up the human capacity for self-conscious thought and that distinguish human beings from other animals. These conceptual skills involve capacities to think not just about oneself, but also about space and time and the nature of physical objects. In attempting to plot the connections between these skills Campbell also undertakes to give an account of how the reference of the first person pronoun is fixed, to rebut the reductionist view of the self and to attack anti-realism about the past. It is a bold and ambitious work repaying close study. In this notice I confine myself to a very brief sketch of Campbell's overall position, followed by discussion of three central areas. First, though, some general comments about the book's approach.

One of the distinctive features of Campbell's approach to the philosophy of mind is that he attempts to do justice to the central role which causality must play in our understanding of ourselves and of the world, while resisting the temptation to see a causal story as saying all there is to say. For example, one of the crucial features distinguishing genuine self-consciousness on Campbell's view is a capacity to think of oneself as causally structured in two dimensions (of which more later). But he is careful to resist any move from this to the sort of reductionist view of the self on which the self can be reduced to causal relations between experiences. Similarly, his account of one important (and basic) way of representing space stresses the way in which causal significance is assigned to places, but he is careful to distance himself from the radical empiricist claim that there can be no non-practical ways of representing space. In very general terms, Campbell's approach offers an alternative both to positions which stress the incommensurability of thought about ourselves and thought about the world, and to positions which seek to assimilate them.

This is connected to the next point, which is that Campbell's project is in several important senses a Kantian project. Certainly the most direct intellectual influences are Strawson and Evans,

* John Campbell, Past, Space and Self, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1994. Pp x + 270.

but both they and Campbell accord central philosophical significance to the Kantian task of working out the connection between self-consciousness and our grasp of the objectivity of the world. And all three, like Kant, think that grasping the objectivity of the world involves grasping the objectivity of space, time and causality, all of which are connected to each other. Methodologically too, Campbell is Kantian, employing forms of argument that are recognisably transcendental (albeit shorn of Kant's pretensions to apodeictic certainty).

A third general point is that Campbell is at pains to integrate empirical work by cognitive psychologists, developmental psychologists and animal learning theorists into his philosophical arguments. This is an unusual step, given that Campbell's philosophical framework is set much more by 'pure' philosophy of mind than by cognitive science (where interaction between philosophers and psychologists is well established). But it is also a productive one, anchoring his discussion and helping him avoid the convoluted thought experiments that often dog debates about necessary relations between conceptual abilities.

The conceptual core of self-conscious thought

On the very first page of the Introduction Campbell specifies that he understands self-consciousness to involve grasping one's own causal structure in two dimensions. First, it involves grasping the idea that one's later states causally depend, at least partially, on one's earlier states. Secondly, there is the less obvious idea that one can function as a common cause of events around one. Both these dimensions of causal structure are shared between persons and physical objects, but Campbell emphasises (pp.145-153) that for a person to be genuinely self-consciousness he must grasp his causal structure in both physical and psychological terms.

Campbell thinks that there are three principal groups of conceptual abilities implicated in such a capacity to grasp the two dimensions of one's causal structure. These include the conceptual abilities that yield an understanding of the causal dimensions of physical objects; those yielding a capacity for objective spatial thought, which he glosses as a capacity to think about space in a way that is not concerned just with the practicalities of navigation (in his terms, it is not exhausted by its implications for action and perception), and those conceptual skills which permit temporal

orientation with respect to particular times. All three are intimately connected with each other, in ways that I shall try to sketch out.

Self-conscious grasp of one's internal causal connectedness clearly requires being able to conceive of oneself as temporally extended. Campbell understands this requirement in a distinctive way, as involving a narrative grasp of one's one life. There are different levels at which one can have such a grasp, the most developed of which is the autobiographical self-understanding that one has plans for the future and that one has had plans in the past, some of which have worked out and others not, etc. Nothing can count as such a narrative grasp, however, if it is not rooted in a way of understanding time that allows one to conceive of past events as having taken place at a particular time, as opposed to the comprehension of time in terms of cycles or phases that might be provided by the time-keeping systems that hibernating animals rely on. This capacity for temporal orientation with respect to past times, as opposed to cycles, is one of the fundamental components of the conceptual repertoire of self-conscious thought.

Orientation with respect to past times is not an isolated phenomenon. It comes with a certain understanding of physical objects. It is our grasp of the continuity of physical objects that underpins our understanding of temporal ordering. A creature who understands the idea of persisting physical continuants with states that are internally causally connected can employ that understanding in imposing the sort of temporal order on events that will allow it distinguish between events that occur at different times, even though they are at the same stage of a given cycle. And then, once able to distinguish temporal order from cyclical order, such a creature will be able to employ its cyclical understanding to order events that are not causally connected.

Understanding physical objects as persisting continuants that are causally structured in two dimensions is also at the core of an objective understanding of space. Campbell notes that it is possible to represent space and reidentify places in a way that does not involve thought about objects. Places might be identified, for example, in terms of features (warmth, for example) which are not causally structured. But this will not provide an understanding of space of the sort that will support a theoretical grasp of ourselves within it. It is, in his terms, a grasp of spatial ordering that is 'exhausted in its implications for action and perception' (see next section). Self-conscious thought

involves being able to think about space in a way that is reflectively independent of our practical situation and requirements. And at this level thought about places is interwoven with thought about things. For example, an objective understanding of space involves grasping that all places are spatially connected with each other (the connectedness of space). At a suitably reflective level, we can understand this in terms of the internal causal connectedness of physical objects (pp.28-9). Partly this is because objects' movements through space causally connect one place with another. But also it is because the continuity of an object's movement imposes an order on the places in its trajectory, an order which is itself structured in terms of our understanding of what causes that object to move. None of this would be possible if places were identified and reidentified in terms of features.

This understanding of physical objects and the objectivity of space is crucial to self-conscious thought because it enables the subject to apprehend his own causal relations to the environment. For example, a self-conscious subject will understand that his perceptions are causally dependent upon the way things are around him, where this requires some understanding of the 'enabling conditions of perception' (that he is appropriately spatially located and looking in the right direction etc). By the same token, such a subject will also understand his interactions with the environment in terms of an explicit physics of lawlike generalizations about how objects behave.

The final dimension of self-conscious thought which it is important to emphasise is its social dimension. This emerges particularly when Campbell discusses what it is for a subject to grasp that he is a common cause. It is one of the areas of the book where psychological work is used to best effect. Drawing on work on infant imitation behaviour Campbell suggests that fully self-conscious thought requires grasping the causal consequences not only of one's bodily actions, but also of one's psychological properties. He illustrates this with an effective contrast between the imitation behaviour which newborn infants are capable of, and that which has been identified in young children at the age of 14 months. It is the latter case, in which the young children are conscious that they are being imitated, and hence of the causal potency of their intentions, that it is appropriate to speak of self-consciousness.

Causal Indexicality vs Causal Non-Indexicality

Much of Campbell's discussion turns on a distinction between two fundamentally different perspectives on the world. One perspective, which he describes in terms of its employment of a primitive physics, is primarily practical and engaged. The other, which uses an explicit physics, is reflective and detached. The distinction is crucial, for he claims that no creature can be self-conscious if its perspective on the world is purely practical. All the core conceptual abilities implicated in self-consciousness require a disengaged perspective. (There are times when he writes as if this distinction mapped easily onto the distinction between animals and humans, but this cannot be his considered position, given his stress on the engaged nature of the human infant's outlook on the world).

To get a clearer understanding of what this distinction involves it is best to start from Campbell's discussion in Chapter 2 of the terms that one might employ in specifying the content of a practical primitive physics. These terms are, he explains, causally indexical. What makes terms like 'now' and 'here' indexical is the fact that their reference varies systematically in different contexts, according to the spatio-temporal location of the thinker. What makes causally indexical terms indexical is the fact that their reference varies according to the causal powers of the thinker. Examples which he gives are '. . . is too heavy to lift', or '. . . is out of reach'. The crucial point is that these terms are grasped in terms of their immediate implications for action and perception: "In these cases, it is not just that grasp of the term requires the ability to register when it applies. It is rather that one uses one's grasp of the causal significance of the term in reacting to recognition that it applies" (p.45). So, for example, one would just give up one's attempts to lift the object in question. A primitive physics, then, is one whose content is to be specified in causally indexical terms. The content of an explicit physics, in contrast, is to be specified in terms which are somehow independent of the practical concerns of the thinker. Campbell describes them in a variety of ways, as 'disengaged', 'reflective' and 'theoretical'.

One very natural question to ask of this distinction is why Campbell should think that it is appropriate to talk of content at all in the case of a creature capable only of deploying a primitive physics. Does the contrast between causal indexicality and causal non-indexicality give us two different ways of representing the world? Or a way of engaging it, on the one hand, and a way of

representing it on the other? If a primitive physics is exhausted in its implications for action and perception, then many theorists would claim that precisely in virtue of that it cannot be a representation of the world. Instead, all we have is a set of physical abilities and behavioural skills, either learnt or hard-wired, which a creature employs in interacting with its environment. Campbell considers this potential objection. He replies: "This would be the correct procedure if there were just one, or a small set, of concisely describable motor routines through which the creature using these concepts could go. But this is not the case for the reasonably skilled performer. Exactly what a creature does, given the description of its surroundings in practical terms, depends in exactly what its goals are. And there is no bound on the goals that a creature may have. The purpose relativity of practical skills, together with the theoretical connectedness of causally indexical and working concepts, means that we cannot get a simple behavioural reduction of them" (p.51).

This is a rather sketchy treatment of a very fundamental issue. What Campbell seems to be claiming is that there is no straightforward mapping between identifiable motor routines and purpose relative practical skills. This might perhaps be granted, although it presumably becomes more and more debatable the further one goes down the phylogenetic ladder. But it is very unclear why this should compel us to talk about a content-involving perspective on the world. One obvious counter is that the combination and recombination of a relatively small number of motor routines will explain what appears to the observer to be a relatively wide range of practical skills. Perhaps, though, Campbell is resting his case on the thought that goal-directed actions involve a representation of the desired goal. This certainly seems to be implied by what he says about squirrels cracking open nuts: "A practical grasp of the properties of the nut means that it can bring about the desired result. . . All the animal has to be able to think about is the upshot" (p.49). But this is very much begging the question. Of course, if we are dealing with intentional behaviour then we are *ipso facto* dealing with representations and content. But why should it be thought that we are dealing with intentional behaviour in the first place?

At the very least, then, the distinction between causally indexical and causally non-indexical modes of representing the world needs to be supplemented by a proper account of intentional vs non-intentional behaviour which will support the suggestion that it is appropriate to talk of content

in both cases. And if such a theory is to be forthcoming Campbell will have to be clarify certain issues which are not properly dealt with at present. For example, even if one agrees with Campbell that certain types of behaviour involve causally indexical content, there is still an important question about what it is that the content attaches to. Sometimes Campbell seems to imply that the content attaches to the practical skills themselves (as when, in discussing working concepts, he suggests that ". . . the grasp of causal significance is not an explicit, reflective grasp but consists in possession of suitable practical skills", p.48). On this view it seems to follow that being capable of behaving in sufficiently complicated ways is sufficient for the presence of content. In other places (as in the discussion of the squirrel mentioned earlier) he seems to suggest rather that the content attaches to the representations which we need to postulate to make sense of the complicated behaviour.

Even once the plausibility of causally indexical content has been shown, however, there will remain questions to be asked about the terms in which it is to be distinguished from causally non-indexical content. The most frequently employed characterisation of causal non-indexicality is in terms of the capacity for reflection. Causally non-indexical representations are detached, or reflective, rather than practical and engaged. Something that is not very clear in the book is what being detached and reflective amounts to. Perhaps the capacity for reflection is linked with the capacity to draw inferences. But if inferences cannot be drawn at the causally indexical level, then it becomes even more pressing to explain why we should describe it in terms of content at all.

Perhaps, as he intimates on p.208, the capacity for reflection is tied to the capacity to generate causal explanations of particular perceptions or actions. But there are obvious problems with this too. One might wonder, for a start, why a causal explanation along the lines of 'I saw the cow because I was appropriately located in the same field as her' should count as being particularly disengaged. But more to the point, it is a useless criterion until we know what is and is not going to count as a causal explanation and the capacity to give such a thing. For example, if young infants show surprise at events which seem to be causally inexplicable, are they *ipso facto* capable of giving causal explanations, as certain developmental psychologists seem to think? Certainly, the ability to provide a fully articulated theory would be an appropriate criterion, but Campbell explicitly denies that this is what he means (pp.207-8).

A suggestion that appears a couple of times is that a particular representation is being employed in a causally non-indexical manner when the creature using it is able to apply it both to itself and to others. That seems to be implied by the following passage ". . . there may be a certain lack of generality in a creature's grasp of causal significance here. A creature may grasp the significance of weight for its own actions but be unable to apply the notion in connection with the actions of other creatures. This tying of causal significance to the creature using the term is characteristic of causally indexical terms" (p.46). If this is his view, then he needs to explain what the connection is between being capable of generality and representing the world in a disengaged manner. It might, for example, be argued (as Evans 1982 attempts to do) that a full capacity to generalise is only available to creatures capable of taking a detached perspective on themselves, where detached is understood in terms of being capable of representing oneself as one person among others.

There would seem to be potential difficulties with any such argument, however (apart from the obvious danger of having a circle of interdefined terms). One is that there does not seem to be anything incoherent about the idea that a creature might generalise a predicate that is defined with reference to its own powers. Consider, for example, 'too heavy to lift', which is a paradigm causal indexical. Could a creature not employ that causal indexical in describing another creature's failure to pick something up, as it might do, for example, if it were trying to decide whether or not to try to pick that thing up itself. The fact that a term is defined with reference to one's own powers does not mean that it cannot be employed to describe someone else (and, of course, vice versa) - unless it is defined with an explicit use of the first person pronoun, which Campbell denies (p.44).

There are questions to be posed for each pole of the distinction. It is not clear that any of them are unanswerable, but until the distinction is articulated more clearly and embedded in a more general theory of what it is to be in a state with content many philosophers and psychologists will be unwilling to accept conclusions as strong as those which Campbell draws.

Self-Reference Self-Knowledge and Self-Consciousness

A prominent sub-theme in Campbell's book is that the sense of the first person pronoun is given by a token-reflexive rule to the effect that any token of 'I' refers to whoever produced it. He

distinguishes such an account from one (like that of Evans, although Campbell does not explicitly attack it) which understands the way the reference of 'I' is fixed on a par with a perceptual demonstrative. According to this second position, one's various modes of self-knowledge would play the same part in fixing the reference of the first person as perceiving an object does in fixing the reference of a perceptual demonstrative. That is, they would provide a way of keeping track of oneself over time. What's wrong with this, Campbell thinks, is that our first person thoughts cannot require keeping track of ourselves over time, because we can engage in first person thought even when we are unable to keep track on ourselves over time. First person thoughts can be thought even when one is in a sensory deprivation tank suffering from total amnesia. Of course, our first person inferences (and memories) trade on our identity over time, but that doesn't mean that we have to keep track of ourselves over time. Instead, what guarantees first person inferences is the fact that tokens of 'I' are governed by the token-reflexive rule, together with the fact that the relevant tokens are all produced by the same person.

Nonetheless, Campbell maintains, there is an important connection between self-reference and self-consciousness. It emerges when one reflects that simply understanding the token-reflexive rule which fixes the reference of 'I' does not itself explain how the first person can be used to express self-knowledge. For example, the reference rule itself does not suggest that 'I' can and indeed should be used to report the unreflective deliverances of perception. He distinguishes the way in which a term's reference is fixed from its conceptual role, understanding this latter in terms of the bases on which we make judgements involving the term and the consequences we draw from those judgements. The relation between reference-fixing and conceptual role is, he suggests, one of concord, where this means that the bases on which judgements employing a singular term are employed must be such as to yield knowledge of the object assigned as reference. It is here that self-consciousness enters the picture (in the reciprocal relation between reference-fixing and conceptual role), because the relevant bases include sensitivity to the two dimensions of causal structure constitutive of self-consciousness and which we discussed earlier.

But one can agree with Campbell's very plausible claim that a proper understanding of how the first person pronoun functions in first person judgements will require bringing in certain very basic

forms of self-knowledge (together with his extremely interesting use of work in developmental psychology to illustrate how that self-knowledge is put to work in young infants) without accepting the original claim that the token-reflexive rule exhausts the sense of the first person pronoun, without building in any requirements of self-knowledge. This initial claim seems rather more questionable. Campbell's basic reason for maintaining it is the thought that reference failure is impossible in the case of the first person pronoun. But is it impossible? Of course, in one sense it is. It is impossible that a genuine and correct use of 'I' should fail to refer to whoever produces it. Everything here hinges on what the criteria of genuineness and correctness are, however. Campbell seems to assume (as many philosophers do) that these criteria will be trivial, and hence that there will be no interesting sense in which reference failure is possible. But since he does not specify what those criteria are this remains an assumption. It is an assumption, moreover, that one might be wary of accepting.

When somebody utters a sentence involving the first person pronoun in their sleep, this is not genuine self-reference, because the sleeping subject does not know that he is employing the first person pronoun. He lacks the self-knowledge that he intends to refer to himself. Compare the case where somebody employs the first-person pronoun in *oratio obliqua*. This is not self-reference either, because the subject knows that he does not intend to refer to himself. But both cases diverge from the standard case, precisely because in standard self-reference a subject utters the first person pronoun with the intention of referring to himself and knowing that he is doing so. To at least this extent, then, some self-knowledge is implicated in fixing the reference of the first person, and when such self-knowledge is lacking there will be failure of reference. That might well seem to be a rather trivial criterion of genuine self-reference. But it might perhaps be extended to seem less trivial. Knowledge that one is uttering the first person pronoun with the intention of referring to oneself does not come out of nowhere. It demands, of course, an understanding of the token-reflexive rule, but it might also be thought to demand some sort of knowledge that one is the sort of thing that can refer to oneself - or of what the purposes and aims of self-reference are. And then one might start wondering what more might be built into this increasingly substantial bit of self-knowledge.

Pursuing such a line of thought would obviously not threaten Campbell's claim that the knowledge of one's causal structure which he implicates in self-consciousness comes in only at the level of conceptual role. And nor does it really threaten the idea that genuine and correct uses of 'I' have guaranteed reference. The point is that the enabling conditions of genuine self-reference might be quite demanding - demanding enough to require a degree of self-knowledge to meet them. And all that this point threatens is the suggestion that holding that the sense of 'I' is given by the token-reflexive rule means that no self-knowledge at all is required for self-reference.

Reductionism and the First Person

Self-consciousness is, according to Campbell, constitutively linked with understanding one's own causal structure. Nonetheless, he thinks, this does not mean that the identities of persons are in any way reducible to causal relations, and he devotes a long chapter to rebutting the reductionist suggestion that they are so reducible. According to the reductionist, we can give a suitably informative definition of personal identity in terms of fundamental relations holding between entities which are more basic than persons. These entities are thoughts, experiences and bodies, and the relations between them are causal. The claim is that by reformulating our talk of persons into talk of causal relations between thoughts and experiences which are themselves causally dependent upon bodies we can produce an impersonal account of the world which requires no reference to persons. And this impersonal view will also be applicable when I think about myself. I can think about myself without having to use the first person, or to refer to certain experiences as my experiences.

Campbell brings a range of arguments into play against the reductionist and sheds much new light on the debate. I will discuss only one of these, one which draws upon his earlier discussion of the first person. Campbell objects to reductionism on the grounds that it runs together two very different things - causal relations between thoughts, on the one hand, and normative relations between thoughts, on the other. As he emphasises, a thinker's first person thoughts are inferentially integrated, where this means that from any two premises, both stated using the first person, the thinker is entitled to draw inferences which trade on the identity of the thing referred to in the two

premises. This applies both to straightforward self-predications, such as 'I am happy' and to more complicated first person psychological states like autobiographical memories.

Campbell offers two lines of argument to show that the reductionist cannot deal with these normative connections. First, he argues that no account formulated in causal terms could possibly capture these normative relations. He makes this vivid in the context of the cases of Multiple Personality Disorder frequently appealed to in the philosophical literature, suggesting that there can be normative connections between statements made by different personalities even when there are no causal connections between them. He also offers a stronger argument, suggesting that making sense of normative connections between thoughts will only be possible if thoughts are ascribed to persons. First person inferences presuppose the identity of the thing referred to in the premises, and: "To know whether we can trade on identity in inferences. . . we need to know whether the same thing is being referred to. But to know this, we have to know whether the same person is thinking both thoughts" (p.176).

The general issue, of course, of whether normative relations can be characterised in causal terms is, of course, one that has very wide bearings in the philosophy of mind, and there would be many functionalists (not necessarily reductionists) who would have conflicting views here. For the sake of argument, however, let us grant Campbell the point. How serious is it to the reductionist? It might be suggested that, far from being fatal to the reductionist, it can be employed to reductionism's advantage, in the following way. The reductionist has to define a 'unity relation' that, when it holds of a set of thoughts and experiences, will unify them so that they become events within a single 'life'. But, it might be suggested, normative relations could be built into this unity relation, so that thoughts which are inferentially integrated in the appropriate manner will count as events within a single life. And it does seem plausible that the fact that there is trading on inferences is good prima facie evidence that one is dealing with a single life. This could not, of course, replace the causal relations which reductionists like Parfit stress, since normative relations hold only across a limited range of thoughts, but there seems no reason why the 'unity relation' might not be given in a combination of causal and normative terms. This strategy would seem to be open to any reductionist who is not an extreme naturalist.

This is why Campbell's second argument is important, because if sound it will block any such move on the part of the reductionist. What Campbell suggests is that one cannot take such normative relations to be basic and employ them to define the unity of a 'life', because the normative relations are themselves parasitic on the notion of a person. So: how successful is Campbell's argument? His premise is undoubtedly true. We obviously do trade on identity in first person inferences. The next question he poses is how we can know whether the same thing is referred to. Now, one of the recurrent themes of the book is that first person thoughts and inferences do not require the thinker to keep track of himself. Thinkers can trade on their identity without being able to keep track of themselves. "For an argument to be formulated at all, we require a single subject to orchestrate it; we cannot have the various premises and conclusion distributed across different subjects with no one marshalling them all together. . . This background point about inference - that it is engaged in by a single subject - explains why it is legitimate for a subject to trade on the identity of any two tokens of 'I' that he has himself produced' (p.105). The point is that trading on identity is self-legitimizing when done by a single subject. This fits in with the anti-reductionist point, if single subject is read in a way that makes subject and person equivalent. The point, then, would be that trading on inferences would only be legitimate when there is continuity of person. So we cannot dispense with talk about persons in the way that the reductionist suggests.

The crucial premise in this anti-reductionist argument is the claim that once one rejects the idea of thinkers having to keep track of themselves there can be nothing that makes trading on identity legitimate except for the bare fact of there being continuity of person. To this, however, the reductionist might well ask why the bare fact that there is continuity of person is given theoretical preference over the bare fact that there is trading on identity. Of course, Campbell might respond that taking the bare fact that there is trading on identity to be basic entails that no distinction can be made between legitimate and illegitimate trading on identity. But to evaluate this claim we need to have in front of us a good example of illegitimate trading on identity which it is important to distinguish from all the obvious examples of legitimate trading on identity. Campbell (pp.104-5) explicitly rules out what might seem prima facie to be an example - namely, a situation in which I say 'I am F', someone else says 'I am G', and I conclude 'I am both F and G'. This is not, he suggests, a case of illegitimate trading on identity because what has gone wrong is either that I

mistook what I heard for something I myself thought, or that I made some completely hopeless inference from 'He is G' to 'I am G'. Neither of these explanations, of course, requires commitment to the existence of persons. But if this is not a case of illegitimate trading on identity then what is? The only example I can find is that quoted in the previous paragraph - namely, a first person argument in which the premises and conclusions are distributed across different subjects. But it seems odd to describe this as a case of illegitimate trading on inferences unless one of those subjects actually affirms the conclusion. Now, suppose that this is done. Surely we can describe what is going on in this case in the same as Campbell describes the previous example - either as a case of mishearing or as a serious non sequitur. So, by Campbell's own lights it is not a case of illegitimate trading on identity. There seems to be a very real question, then, about what if anything counts as the sort of trading on identity that we need to exclude. I personally cannot think of any examples.

The point is this. If there are no clear cases of illegitimate trading on identity, then it is unclear why so much stress needs to be laid on the legitimacy of trading on identity. Why not just take it as a brute fact, in the way that the reductionist suggests, that in certain situations there will be a disposition to make certain first person inferences and draw certain first person conclusions, and that the existence of this disposition is part of what it is for a set of thoughts and experiences to be connected up in a way that it is appropriate to describe as a single 'life'. Of course, an observer will not always want to accept those inferences and conclusions. In that sense there is a distinction to be made between legitimate and illegitimate cases of trading on identity. But it is not obviously the case that in explaining what is wrong with those inferences and conclusions one will need to bring in the concept of a person.