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Semantics and Psychological Evidence April 15 - 16, 2005 Current list of speakers: o
Ana Arregui, Assistant
Professor of Linguistics, University of Ottawa, aarregui@uottawa.ca o
David
A. Balota, Professor of Psychology, Washington University in St.
Louis, dbalota@artsci.wustl.edu o
Steven
E. Petersen, Professor of Neurology, Associate Professor of Anatomy
and Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychology, Washington University in
St. Louis, sep@npg.wustl.edu o
Philip Robbins,
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis,
probbins@artsci.wustl.edu o
Robert
J. Stainton, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Western
Ontario, rstainto@uwo.ca o
Kenneth A. Taylor,
Professor and Chair of Philosophy, Stanford University, taylor@turing.stanford.edu Organizer: Sam Scott, Post-Doctoral Fellow, Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program, Washington University in St. Louis, sscott@artsci.wustl.edu Contact: Kimberly Mount, Secretary, Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program, Washington University in St. Louis, kmount@wustl.edu, phone:314-935-4297, fax:314-935-7349 Background This
workshop is organized under the auspices of the Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology
Research Center (PNPRC) at Washington University in St Louis. The PNP
Research Center sponsors interdisciplinary research activity focused
on the scientific study of the mind/brain. Activities supported by the
center include conferences, workshops, seminar series and colloquia.
The center also hosts visiting faculty in the PNP program, including
the Clark-Way-Harris Visiting Professors. The
aim of the workshop is to bring together researchers from a range of
disciplines to discuss prospects for the use of empirical evidence in
the investigation of the semantics of natural languages. Invited speakers
have been asked to reflect on the general prospects for the incorporation
of psychological and neuroscientific evidence into the study of natural
language semantics, as well as to comment on specific examples of the
use of psychological or neuroscientific evidence in semantic theorizing,
drawing on their own work or the work of others.
Aims Historically, the study of natural language semantics
in linguistics and philosophy has proceeded without the use of empirical
evidence from psychology or neuroscience. Some of the reasons for this
have been purely practical – e.g., the lack of availability of such
evidence, the difficulty of applying existing psychological evidence
to semantics, and the inability of semanticists to conduct psychological
studies of their own. But some have advanced principled reasons for
excluding such evidence – e.g. Katz argued that language is an abstract
object rather than a psychological one, Quine precluded the incorporation
of any data other than the behavioral data necessary to establish stimulus
meaning, and Wittgenstein argued that linguistic meaning derives solely
from the use of language in social practices. But since the cognitive revolution, linguists and
philosophers of language often take themselves to be studying a faculty
of the mind rather than an abstract object, or a set of behavioral responses
or social practices. Many linguists now conceive of linguistics as the
study of a psychological faculty implemented in the brain, and much
work in semantics now aims to be continuous with the new cognitivist
science of linguistics. Recently, following this cognitive turn to its
logical conclusion, a few researchers have begun to look to psychology
and other empirical sciences to evaluate theories in semantics and pragmatics.
Is this turn towards psychology justified? When, if at all, can psychological
evidence be used to help settle issues in semantics? Similar questions have been asked numerous times about
linguistic knowledge in general. The goal of this workshop is to advance
the discussion in two ways: first, by discussing the problem as related
to natural language semantics in particular (including reference
and intentionality) rather than linguistic knowledge in general; second,
by asking the presenters to comment on specific examples of the
use of psychological data in semantic theory, drawing on their own work
or the work of others. The specific research questions addressed by the workshop
are: 1.
What
can psychological evidence tell us about the semantics of natural language? 2.
What
can psychological evidence tell us about the referential/intentional
properties of language and the mind? 3.
What
lessons can we draw from specific examples of the use of psychological
data to support or criticize theories in formal semantics?
Speakers and participants The
six speakers have been invited, listed above, to represent perspectives
from philosophy, psychology, linguistics, and cognitive neuroscience.
The
other invited workshop participants will predominantly be faculty members
and graduate students from Washington University affiliated with the
PNP program. Disciplinary backgrounds of the participants will likely
include philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and linguistics.
Format The
workshop is intended to offer the maximum opportunities for discussion.
There will be six main sessions, each 90 minutes long, with 45 minutes
devoted to the presentation and 45 minutes for general discussion. PROGRAM Semantics and Psychological Evidence
Workshop All sessions will be held at Clayton
on the Park Hotel, St. Louis, MO (www.ClaytonOnThePark.com). Friday, April 15, 2005 1:00 - 1:30 Introduction
to the Workshop 1:30 - 3:00 Title:
*TBA* 3:00 - 3:30    Refreshments 3:30 - 5:00
Title: *TBA* Dave Balota (Washington University in St. Louis) Saturday, April 16, 2005
Ana Arregui (University of Ottawa) 10:30 - 12:00 Title:
*TBA* Steve Petersen (Washington University in St. Louis) 12:00 Lunch 2:00 - 3:30
Pragmatics Everywhere Kenneth Taylor (Stanford University) 3:30 - 4:00    Refreshments 4:00 - 5:30
"Is Semantics Modular?" Steve Petersen (Washington University in St. Louis) 7:00 Workshop
Dinner, Cardwell's in Clayton Contact: Kimberly Mount Secretary, Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program
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