PHILOSOPHY Colloquia: 4:15, Wilson Hall, Rm. 214
Fall 2009 (TBA)
| Sept. 10 | Philosophy Colloquium, 4:15, Al Hajek, Australian National University "Most Counterfactuals Are False" |
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| Oct. 8 | Philosophy Colloquium, 4:15, |
Spring 2009
| Jan. 15 | Emily Austin, Washington University "Epicurus and the Politics of Fearing Death." |
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| Jan. 22 | Sarit Smila, Washington University "Special Relationships, Care, and the Acquisition of Virtue" |
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| March 2 | Joint Colloquium - Philosophy, JINES, Religious Studies, Classics, and History Patricia Crone, Istitute for Advanced Studies in Princeton "From Late Antiquity to the Islamic World: Who Were the Godless Empiricists?" |
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| March 5 | Steven Darwall, Yale University "But it would be wrong" |
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| March 26 | E. J. Lowe, Durham Univesity, UK "Why My Body is not Me: The Unity Argument for Emergentist Self-Body Dualism" |
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| April 2 | John Norton "Philosophy & Einstein's discovery of the theories of relativity" |
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| April 6 **note day change | Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Dartmouth Contrastivism & Degrees of Freedom" |
Fall 2008
| Oct. 2 | Fred Adams, University of Delaware Title: TBA |
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| Oct. 8 | Dan Levitin, 11:15-12:45, Psych 216 A & B **note special time & location |
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| Oct. 23 | Jim Hankinson, Univ. of Texas "Opposition, refutation and 'undecidable dispute': the methodology of Pyrrhonian argument" |
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| Nov. 20 | John Greco, SLU Evidentialism about Knowledge Abstract: I argue against a position that I call "evidentialism about knowledge." Part 1 articulates the position as a supervenience thesis: roughly, that the facts about epistemic normativity supervene on the facts about evidence. A corollary of this thesis is that all knowledge requires good evidence. The remainder of the paper puts forward a dilemma for evidentialism about knowledge. Specifically, any version of evidentialism must be either internalist or externalist about what counts as good (i.e. knowledge-producing) evidence. But internalist versions of evidentialism are false and externalist versions are unmotivated. More exactly, once we adopt externalism about what counts as good evidence, we lose any motivation for thinking that all knowledge requires evidence. On the contrary, it seems that basing one's beliefs on good evidence is just one way to acquire knowledge among many. |
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| Dec. 4 | Emily Crookston, Wash U "Solving the Problem of Political Obligation: the Anarchist Challenge and the Natural Duty to Consent." |
Spring 2008
| Jan. 17th | PNP Colloquium, 4:15, Wilson Hall, Rm. 214 Rick Grush, UCSD "What am I? An exploration of some relationships between the mind and the brain" |
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| Jan. 31st | Colloquium, 4:15, Wilson Hall, Rm. 214 Mazviita Chirimuuta, Cambridge “Does ‘evolved to see red’ imply ‘ought to see red’?” |
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| Feb. 7th | Colloquium, 4:15, Wilson Hall, Rm. 214 Frederick Eberhardt, Carnegie Mellon Title: TBA |
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| Feb. 14th | Colloquium, 4:15, Wilson Hall, Rm. 214 Jacob Beck, Harvard Title: TBA |
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| March 6th | PNP Colloquium, 4:15, Wilson Hall, Rm. 214 Paul Teller, University of CA, Davis "Some Dirty Little Secrets About Truth" |
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| March 27th | PNP Colloquium, 4:15, Wilson Hall, Rm. 214 Lindley Dardin, (Univ. of Maryland) Clark Way-Harrison visiting Professor Title: TBA |
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| April 10th | PNP Colloquium, 4:15, Wilson Hall, Rm. 214 Cory Wright, PNP Post-Doc Title: TBA |
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| April 24th | Colloquium, 4:15, Wilson Hall, Rm. 214 David Kaplan, PNP Post-Doc Title: TBA |
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| May 1st | Philosophy Colloquium, 4:15, Wilson Hall, Rm. 214 David Robb, Davidson College Title: TBA |