PNP WIPS: 4:15 pm, Psychology Bldg., Rm. 215 A & B

Spring 2009

Jan. 30   Brandon Towl, Washington University
"The Identity Theory and Mind-Brain Correlations"
Abstract: One of the positive arguments for type-identity theory is an inference-to-the-best-explanation argument. Such an argument purports to
show that type-identity theory is likely true because it is the best explanation for the correlations between mental states and brain states that we
find in the neurosciences. But, given the methods of neuroscience, there are other relations besides identity that can explain such correlations.
I illustrate some of these relations by examining the literature on the function of the hypothalamus and its correlation with sensations of thirst.
Given that there are relations besides identity that can explain such correlations, the type-identity theorist is left with a dilemma:
either the correlations we look at are weak, in which case we do not have an IBE argument for an identity claim, or else the correlations
we look at are maximally strong, in which case there are too few cases for the inductive part of the strategy to work.
Feb. 27   Paul Weirich, University f Missouri, Columbia
"Collective Acts"

Abstract: Groups of people perform acts.  For example, a committee passes a resolution, a team wins a game, and an orchestra performs a symphony.  These collective acts may be evaluated for rationality.  Take a committee's passing a resolution.  This act may be evaluated not only for fairness but also for rationality.  Did it take account of all available information?  Is the resolution consistent with the committee's past resolutions?  Standards of collective rationality apply to collective acts, that is, acts that groups of people perform. What makes a collective act evaluable for rationality?  What methods of evaluation apply to collective acts?  This paper addresses these two questions.
Collective rationality is rationality's extension from individuals to collectives.  The paper's first few sections review key points about rationality.  They identify the features of an individual's act that make it evaluable for rationality and distinguish methods of evaluating acts directly and indirectly controlled.  This preliminary work yields general principles of rationality for all agents, both individuals and groups.  Applying the general principles to groups answers the paper's two main questions about collective rationality.
March 6   Lauries Santos, Yale
preliminary title: "The evolution of irrationality: insights from non-human primates."
March 27  

Rob Cummins, University of Illinois-Urbana/Champaign
Meaning and Content in Cognitive Science:

What are the prospects for a cognitive science of meaning? As stated, we think this question is ill posed, for it invites the conflation of several importantly different semantic concepts. In this paper, we want to distinguish the sort of meaning that is an explanandum for cognitive science—something we are going to call meaning—from the sort of meaning that is an explanans in cognitive science—something we are not going to call meaning at all, but rather content. What we are going to call meaning is paradigmatically a property of linguistic expressions or acts: what one’s utterance or sentence means, and what one means by it. What we are going to call content is a property of, among other things, mental representations and indicator signals. We will argue that it is a mistake to identify meaning with content, and that, once this is appreciated, some serious problems emerge for grounding meaning in the sorts of content that cognitive science is likely to provide.

April 3   Eric Olson, University of Sheffield
April 17   Jason Leddington, Bucknell College

 

Fall 2008

Sept. 5

 

Gualtiero Piccinnini, UMSL
"Computationalism in the Philosophy of Mind"
Abstract: Computationalism has been the mainstream view of cognition for decades.  There are periodical reports of its demise, but they are greatly exaggerated.  This essay surveys some recent literature on computationalism.  It concludes that computationalism is a family of theories about the mechanisms of cognition.  The main relevant evidence for testing it comes from neuroscience, though psychology and AI are relevant too.  Computationalism comes in many versions, which continue to guide competing research programs in philosophy of mind as well as psychology and neuroscience.
Oct. 24   Richard A. Abrams, Professor of Psychology, WUSTL
Title: TBA
Nov. 21   Philip Meier, Neurobiology, UC San Diego
Dec. 5   CANCELED - Maurizio Corbetta, M.D. Associate Professor of Neurology and Radiology, WUSTL

 

SPRING 2008

Jan. 18

 

TBA

Feb. 1

 

Robert Goldston, Indiana University, Psychology Dept.
"Learning to Perceive to Learn"

Feb. 15

 

David Balota, Washington University, Psychology Dept., Linguistics Program
"Mental Chronometry: Some Novel Insights into Measuring the Speed of Mental Operations"

March 7

 

Hannah Sypher Locke, Washington University, Psychology Dept.
Title: TBA

April 11

 

Rasmus Winther, University of CA, Santa Cruz
"Mechanisms, History, and Part-Based Explanation in the Biological Sciences"

April 25

 

Santiago Amaya, Washington University, PNP Program
Title: TBA

 

Past (Fall 2007)

 

Sept. 21

 

Sarah Robins, Washington University, PNP Program
"Residual Normality and Cognitive Development: Why developmental disorders do not support massive modularity."

Sept. 26

 

Oron Shagrir, Hebrew University
“Marr’s level’s of computational explanation”

Oct. 11

 

Christoph Jäger, University of Aberdeen, UK
 "Higher-Order Emotions"

Oct. 26

 

J. D. Trout, Loyola University
"Hooked on a Feeling of Understanding: (Neural) Pathways to Explanation"

Nov. 9

 

Kim Haddix, Washington University, PNP Program
Title: TBA

Nov. 30

 

Steve Petersen, Washington University, Neuroscience Dept.
"Using social network tools to study the brain at a systems level"