PNP Program: Graduate Program

Cave Series

March 19th, 2009
Arnon Cahen
‘What is the epistemic problem of perception? And surprising afterthoughts’

Abstract:
The answer can be formulated as an inconsistent triad:
Perceptual justification – Some perceptions provide us reasons (for beliefs or actions)
Exclusivity – Only beliefs provide us reasons
Bifurcation – No perception is a belief
The central claim of this paper is that a refined version of each proposition is independently plausible, and that reflecting on this buoyant inconsistency illuminates central concerns in the epistemology of perception. The negation of any member of the triad carries characteristic costs that reveal natural cleavages in the literature on perception. I will finally suggest that rejecting, or modifying, Exclusivity is the least costly, yet also least attended to strategy in the literature. Afterthought: It’s a surprise, come and see!

Feb. 12th, 2009
Don Wilson-Goodman
‘Modularity and Mechanism and Hodgkin and Huxley’

Mechanisms explain (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000). But how do scientists discover mechanisms in the first place? Woodward (2002), Craver (2008), and Steel (2008), among others, have augmented the Machamer-Darden-Craver account of mechanisms with Woodward's (2003) manipulationist account of causation. Indeed, this combination holds potential as the basis of an account of mechanism discovery. However, there stands a significant obstacle to developing such an account: Many purported mechanisms turn out to violate Woodward's Modularity condition—a condition that requires that mechanisms be composed of independently modifiable parts. Hodgkin and Huxley's (1952) voltage clamp experiments on the squid giant axon brought us our first clear understanding of the mechanism for the action potential. Their work is a clear example of manipulationist practice, and a case of mechanism discovery. However, these experiments also run afoul of Modularity. If so, then Hodgkin and Huxley's work stands as a counter-example to the possibility of a manipulationist account of mechanism discovery. I argue that the way to clear this hurdle is to reinterpret the Modularity requirement as a pair of distinct principles, one epistemological and one ontological. The epistemological version provides a rule for updating our mechanism models in the face of experimental evidence. The ontological version provides a precondition for a mechanism to be discoverable by manipulationist means in the first place. So doing permits us to understand the mechanism for the action potential as indeed Modular, and opens the door to a manipulationist account of mechanism discovery.

Jan. 29th, 2009
John Gabriel
'A Pyrrhic Victory Against Vagueness in Proper Names'

Abstract: Vagueness is endemic to ordinary language, extending even to proper names. Here, I consider two non-epistemic accounts of vagueness in proper names: 1) On which our use of vague proper names does not completely determine their meaning. Truth-values of statements containing vague proper names are determined by supervaluationist truth-conditions. 2) On which vague proper names denote logically defined, sortal-relative representations of physical objects. I argue that neither view adequately accounts for vagueness in poper names. The objects these views take as possible referents of vague proper names cannot be what vague proper names denote. To maintain our intuition that the physical world is precise without recourse to an epistemic account, I consider a third view: On which vague proper names refer to a vague representation realized by the precise physical world. This view accounts for vagueness in proper names at the cost of committing us to metaphysically queer, vague representations.

Nov. 6th, 2008
Isaac Wiegman
‘Reductionism and Causal Explanation’

Abstract: Reductionist theorists (those committed to the explanatory priority of fundamental sciences) are standardly opposed to giving higher level theories like psychology any kind of independence from more fundamental theories like physics. I propose to undermine such opposition. I will consider two motivations for supposing that causal explanations in higher level theories are (in a sense that I will clarify later) subordinate to such explanations in lower level theories. One motivation arises from a way of applying Ockham's razor to explanations and another arises from an appeal to certain features of laws of nature as explanatory. I will argue that neither of these motivations is required by reductionism (characterized by a set of propositions I will lay out) and that the causal explanations given by non-fundamental theories are independent of causal explanations in more fundamental sciences. This follows from certain premises about causal explanation that are independently plausible and that need not be rejected by reductionism. The first premise is that there is a robust connection between common sense causal explanations and causal explanations in the sciences. The second is that the only way to do justice to this connection is by understanding causal explanations as
conveying manipulability relations.

Sept. 25th, 2008
Juan Montana
'The Principle of Causal Independence'

Abstract: The literature on the manipulationist account of causality refers to two related but different notions by the name of 'modularity'. The first, modularity proper, is a requirement on the causal interpretation of structural models. The second, here referred to as the Principle of Causal Independence (PCI), is a metaphysical principle about the causal structure of the world. The two notions are related. Structural models cannot represent causal structures, unless they are modular. This is only true if the PCI is true. Cartwright, however, thinks the PCI is false. This paper argues in favor of the PCI in the context of the modularity requirement. The main argument is transcendental in the sense
that it aims to show that the PCI is an assumption without which there would be no science as we know it. Given the limitations of this sort of arguments, I also argue that
Cartwright's argument against it fails to cast doubt on the principle and relies on a mistaken understanding of what counts as a causal factor. This will also serve as a clarification of the later notion.

Feb. 28th, 2008
Isaac Wiegman
‘Computational Problems and Mental Content’

Abstract: I take a look at Marr’s computational theory of vision and Frances Egan’s interpretation of it. I then argue against Egan that there is a computational rationale to individuate mental states by their content when the computational problem shifts from extracting 3-D information from a 2-D image toward explaining the visually guided behaviors of an organism. Moreover, I argue that the kind of content that is useful for such purposes is narrow.

Jan. 24th, 2008
Santiago Amaya
‘Dispositions, Conditionals and Ceteris Paribus Clauses’

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to argue for a functionalist version of the conditional analysis of dispositions. This version of the analysis seeks to overcome the objections from finks, antidotes and maskers, widely discussed in the recent literature on dispositions. It is argued that doing justice to the conditional analysis requires distinguishing the circumstances in which a disposition is attributed to an object from the circumstances in which the attribution ought to be evaluated. On the basis of this distinction, the paper presents a version of the conditional analysis grounded on two basic principles. This version of the analysis is compatible with the thesis that an object can have a disposition that it could not possibly manifest.

Nov. 2nd, 2007
Don Goodman
‘Toasters, Carburetors, and the Causal Structure of the Universe’ or ‘How to Hotrod Your Car with Only an Intuition and Some First Principles’

Abstract: The modularity condition is at the center of a decade-long debate in the philosophy of science. Modularity states that, on one interpretation, experimental interventions should not disrupt the causal structure of the system being investigated. Nancy Cartwright capitalizes on this interpretation, using it to demonstrate that the principle cannot be universally true. She demonstrates that lots of every-day devices---toasters and carburetors---violate this principle, that is, they cannot be intervened into without disrupting their causal structure. I argue that her interpretation of modularity is mistaken, and that she has instead characterized a stronger and clearly false principle. Her arguments, once modularity is properly understood, do not stick: Toasters and carburetors really are modular after all.

Sep. 27th, 2007
Brandon Towl
‘Causal Powers’

Abstract: In this paper, I explore the notion of a "causal power", particularly as it is relevant to a theory of properties whereby properties are individuated by the causal powers they bestow on the objects that instantiate them. I take as my target certain eliminativist positions that argue that certain kinds of properties do not exist because they fail to bestow unique causal powers on objects. But the notion of a causal power is inextricably bound up with our notion of what an event is. And not only is there disagreement as to which theory of events is appropriate, but on the three prevailing theories, it can be shown that the eliminativists arguments do not follow.

Nov. 30th, 2006
Sarah Robins
‘The Conceptual Leap: How Children Learn about the Nature of Writing.’

Oct. 26th, 2006
Juan Montana
‘Is Brain Plasticity Evidence against Innate Knowledge of Language Principles?’

April 6th, 2006
Amy Wilson
‘Just War Theory and Civil War: The Challenges of Adapting an Interstate Theory to an Intrastate Problem’

March. 23rd, 2006
David Speetzen
‘A Dynamic State of Nature: Reinterpreting Hobbesian Anarchy in Leviathan’

Abstract: In this paper, I argue that a close reading of Hobbes' yields an interpretation of the state of nature on which it is a dynamic model and schematic history of the development of human social organization. On this reading, continual fluctuation in the balance of power between political communities, along with each community’s need for security against aggressors, motivates sustained efforts at increased defensive capabilities, accomplished primarily through growth in population. This tendency towards larger and larger political communities explains the historical progression from small families, to larger families or tribes, to cities, and eventually, to whole kingdoms. At each level of social organization, entities of similar size are engaged in an arms race against their neighbors. I argue that this dynamic most accurately captures what Hobbes had in mind when he refers to the state of nature throughout Leviathan. First, I set out the received view of the state of nature, present a brief gloss of how this view is informed by the Prisoners Dilemma, and suggest points where this interpretation is inadequate. Then, I set the groundwork for my own view by establishing that Hobbes thought that the state of nature characterizes both interpersonal as well as international relations. Next, I argue that Hobbes thinks that there are multiple levels of social organization between these two extremes, at which a state of nature is equally evident. I then explain how Hobbes thought issues of security and conflict drive transitions from one level to another, and argue that this progression is an explicitly descriptive and historical account of the development of human social organization. Finally, I explain how my interpretation could influence some contemporary debates surrounding Hobbes, the state of nature, and international relations.

Feb. 23rd, 2006
Arnon Cahen
‘The Implicit Self in Perception’

Feb. 10th 2006
Don Goodman
‘The Balky Television, or How Defective Electronic Devices Can Give Us Insight into the Causal Structure of the World’

Feb. 3rd, 2006
Sarah Robins
‘The Failure of Success Semantics: Accounting for Ignorance and Error in Nonlinguistic Thought’

Abstract: Some nonlinguistic creatures behave in ways that make them plausible candidates for inclusion in the category of thinking beings. Causal covariance and teleosemantic views account for the existence of nonlinguistic thought, but do not help us to identify the contents of such thoughts. I refer to these as the semantic and the epistemological projects, respectively. José Bermúdez (2003) argues that success semantics can support an account of nonlinguistic thought that accounts for both the existence and contents of nonlinguistic thought. Joining the semantic and epistemological projects is a potential advantage of this proposal. In this paper, I examine the degree to which success semantics can be seen as providing an answer to the epistemological question regarding the contents of nonlinguistic thought. I argue that though it does present an advantage over other accounts, it does not completely resolve the issue. Success semantics has difficulty differentiating error from ignorance, and in assessing the relation of beliefs to action, and thus cannot account for the contents of all nonlinguistic thought.

Dec. 15th, 2005
Emily Crookston
‘A Lockean Theory of Secession’

Nov. 10th, 2005
Santiago Amaya
'Our Sense of Agency'